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1. Introduction: Asian Crisis and the Banking Sector Problems 
The banking sector has been one of the most important sectors in Thailand. The size of the 
banking sector has been much larger than the Thai stock market. Table 1:1 shows that the 
ratios of banks’ total assets to GDP were over 100% throughout the period 1996-2003. The 
ratio of the market capitalization to GDP, however, ranged from 27.4% to 80.7%. Among 
financial institutions, commercial banks have dominated the financial sector in terms of size, 
lending, and deposits. So, banking problems can easily affect the economy negatively.  
The bad loan problems that bankrupted a number of banks and financial companies came out 
around 1996. The problems started with the difficulties of Bangkok Bank of Commerce. 
About six months later, the finance companies began to experience similar difficulties and the 
downward spiral led to massive interventions by the government. Overall, 58 finance 
companies were suspended in 1997, a further 12 finance companies in 1998, and one in 1999. 
In relation to banking, the first intervention began in 1998 when six banks were suspended to 
be followed by one more in 1999. As a result of bank consolidations and closure, the number 
of banks declined from 15 in 1996 to 13 by 2001. Out of the 15 domestic banks operating in 
1996, one was closed down, three were merged with government owned banks, two were 
taken over by the government and three became foreign owned. The remaining banks have 
been struggling to recapitalize on their own. 
Weak corporate governance and prudential controls were thought to be the most important 
factors that caused the banking crisis (Siamwalla, 2001). Weak corporate governance allowed 
banks to engage in risky lending that was based on overvalued collateral and connection 
(Charumilind, Kali, Wiwattanakantang, 2006). The sharp drop in the stock and real estate 
markets combined with the rise in interest rates in 1996 aggravated banks’ liquidity and 
solvency problems.   
The most notable incident concerned Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC), a medium sized 
bank. According to the Nukul Commission (1998)
1, BBC extended massive loans to its 
executives to engage in takeover activities with no collateral and contract. In June 1996, the 
Thai government accused the bank’s president (who was also the major shareholder), advisor, 
and a close friend of the bank’s president of defrauding the bank of 2.2 billion baht. By the 
time when BBC collapsed in 1996, the bank had bad debts of about 98% of its total loans, 
requiring an injection of almost 100 billion baht in public money. The fall of BBC 
represented an early sign that eventually led to the 1997 financial crisis.  
                                                            
1 The Nukul Commission Report was prepared for the government in 1998 with the objective to identify the 
causes of economic and mismanagement and corruption in the Bank of Thailand (BOT). The report provides 
recommendations to improve the efficiency of the financial system and reforms of the BOT. The Chairperson of   2
While superficially this situation resulted from poor quality loan portfolios, the underlying 
issues that led to this situation included corruption and the failure of the banks’ risk 
management system. Moreover, the practices of rescuing troubled banks over the past by the 
financial authorities created moral hazard and promoted banks’ excessive risk-taking. The 
implicit full guarantee also hampered market discipline by depositors and creditors. Besides 
weak corporate governance at banks, poor bank supervision and examination by the 
authorities were also responsible to connected lending and management fraud. Until 1996, the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) had punished neither financial institutions nor their executives for 
lending to risky projects. For example, the BOT failed to detect the seriousness of the BBC’s 
problems with NPLs that began in 1991 (Nukul Commission, 1998). Hence, the BOT did not 
take appropriate actions such as replacing the bank’s incumbent management and reducing its 
capital. The BOT only stepped in when there was a run on bank deposits in 1996. 
In this study, we review the policy responses to the financial sector crisis and the 
restructurings taken by the government and banks since 1997. We show that massive 
restructurings have been undertaken to strengthen the soundness and stability of the banking 
system. At the country level, the government implemented various measures to improve the 
central bank’s capacity in supervising and examining the financial sector and enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance of Thai financial institutions. At the bank level, a 
number of restructurings were undertaken which included the disposal of bad loans and the 
establishment of good corporate governance and risk management system.   
We also review government efforts to reform corporate governance of banks, ensure safety 
nets of the Thai financial system, and strengthen market discipline in the banking sector. 
More importantly, we evaluate the effectiveness of the current banks’ internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and the government’s policy efforts to enhance corporate 
governance in the banking sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews measures implemented by the 
government to restructure banks and restore the financial sector. Among them were the policy 
efforts to enhance corporate governance of banks. Section 3 discusses the safety net 
frameworks with the focus on the evaluation of the blanket guarantee and the role of 
prudential regulation. This section also discusses the role of regulators. Section 4 addresses 
the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms of Thai banks and the 
measures to improve corporate governance by the government using the results drawn from 
the survey. Section 5 evaluates the strength of market discipline in the Thai banking sector. In 
addition, this section shows the ownership and control of Thai commercial banks and 
addresses the effects of the crisis on the banks’ control structure. Section 6 summarizes the 
findings and provides some policy implications. 
********************* 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the commission was Nukul Prachuabmoh, a former governor of the BOT. Other members include several 
leading economists and lawyers.   3
Insert Table 1:1 here 
********************* 
2. Evolution and Restructuring of the Banking Sector 
In this section, we review the banking problems and restructuring measures implemented 
both by the government and banks to cope with the problems that emerged from the 1997 
financial crisis. We also investigate how the ownership structure of Thai financial institutions 
has changed enormously as a result of bank failures and drastic restructurings. Finally, we 
describe the policy efforts to promote effective corporate governance of banks.  
Restructuring Measures Implemented in 1997-1998 
By August 1997, 58 finance companies were insolvent and their licenses were suspended 
while 33 of 91 financial institutions were deemed viable and continued operating. To restore 
public confidence in the remaining operating institutions, the government, with the support 
and advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), initiated several programs to stabilize 
the macro economy and restore the financial market stability (Flatter, 1999; Santiprabhob, 
2003).  
The immediate measure implemented was the introduction of a blanket guarantee in August 
1997, with a view to restoring public confidence in the banking industry. The BOT also 
tightened the rules for establishing capital adequacy and defining the provision of non- 
performing loans. To restore the effectiveness of the financial industry and increase 
transparency and competition in the financial sector, the government improved prudential 
regulations and introduced a supervisory regime. In 1997 and 1998, several emergency 
amendments to the BOT, commercial banking and finance company laws were passed to 
enable the authorities to intervene promptly in regard to nonviable financial institutions. 
In October 1997, the Thai government announced a comprehensive restructuring plan for the 
banking and financial sector. The plan included the following measures: (i) setting up the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) and Asset Management Companies (AMCs) 
to provide a framework for the initial disposal of the assets of nonviable financial institutions 
and restoration of the financial system, (ii) introducing international standards governing loan 
classification and provisioning and the interest accrual for financial institutions, and (iii) 
establishing a deposit insurance scheme.  
To reestablish stability in the financial system, the government required the undercapitalized 
financial institutions to strengthen their capital base. To facilitate the process of 
recapitalization, in June 1997 the restrictions on the foreign ownership in financial 
institutions were relaxed from 25% to 100% for a period of 10 years. After 10 years, foreign 
shareholders could maintain or lower but not raise their stakes in financial institutions until 
the stake is less than 50%.     4
The first wave of bank intervention began in early 1998. The banks involved were Bangkok 
Metropolitan Bank, Bangkok Bank of Commerce, Siam City Bank, and First Bangkok City 
Bank. In August 1998, another two banks, Laem Thong Bank, Union Bank of Bangkok were 
the subjects of intervention, and BBC was closed down. In total, the government intervened 
in seven banks out of 15 banks.  
An extensive restructuring plan was initiated on August 14, 1998 under the title “August 14 
financial restructuring package”. The plan was to disentangle the financial crisis, strengthen 
banks’ deposit base, and overhaul credit flows to productive sectors. To accelerate the 
resolution of distressed financial institutions, two banks were nationalized. To recapitalize 
viable financial institutions, the government provided capital support. Two banks received 
tier 1 capital support in the form of 10 years government bonds in exchange for preferred 
shares. Another three banks received capital injection in the form of government bonds in 
exchange for their subordinated debt. 
Under the restructuring process, Thai banks raised 959 billion baht (Bank of Thailand, 2000). 
Of this amount, the government contributed 293 billion baht, of which 241 billion baht was 
injected to state banks (including private banks intervened by the government). Another 10 
billion baht of the government’s funds was provided to a number of finance companies 
(Siamwalla, 2001).  
The government also implemented various measures to deal with the intervened banks 
individually. The time schedule of the implementation of the measures is presented in Table 
2:1. 
(1)  Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC): The good assets were transfer to the government 
owned Krung Thai Bank (KTB). All the NPLs were kept at the bank. The BBC was 
turned into an Asset Management Company (AMC). The employees were laid off with 
full compensation. The Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) converted all 
the loans provided to the BBC to the KTB’s capital.  
(2)  First Bangkok City Bank (FBCB): All of its assets, liabilities and staff were transferred 
to KTB. The FIDF provided a yield maintenance and gain/loss sharing scheme as part 
of the package. 
(3)  Laem Thong Bank (LTB): Radanasin Bank (RSB) absorbed LTB. RSB was established 
in March 1998 to manage good assets acquired from the 56 closed finance companies. 
Depositors and creditors of LTB were transferred to RSB. The staff remained employed 
and received the same remuneration. RSB was later acquired by United Overseas Bank 
(UOB) and renamed UOB Radanasin Bank (UOBR). The FIDF offered yield 
maintenance and gain/loss sharing arrangements to UOBR. 
(4)  Union Bank of Bangkok (UB): UB was consolidated with the government owned 
Krung Thai Thanakit Finance (KTT) together with another 12 intervened finance   5
companies. The consolidated identity became a bank, Bank Thai (BT). The staff of UB 
remained employed and received the same remuneration.  
(5)  Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) and Siam City Bank (SCIB): The two banks were 
nationalized. In 2002, BMB was consolidated with SCIB. SCIB was assigned to be the 
core bank because of its larger asset base. All of the BMB’s assets, liabilities and 
employees were transferred to SCIB.  
(6)  Nakornthon Bank. It was nationalized in 1999, then recapitalized and sold to Standard 
Chartered Bank in 1999. 
In addition to the government’s recapitalization program, major banks were able to 
recapitalize on their own by raising funds through issuing shares and capital securities to 
foreign investors. Consequently, many banks became foreign owned. The Development Bank 
of Singapore acquired about 50.3% of the shares of Thai Danu Bank. Similarly, about 75% of 
the shares of Bank of Asia were acquired by ABN-AMRO Bank of the Netherlands.  
********************* 
Insert Table 2:1 here 
********************* 
Dealing with Impaired Assets 
To deal with the extent of non-performing assets at financial institutions, the government 
encouraged debt restructuring in both financial and corporate sectors. Legal, regulatory, and 
tax reforms were introduced to establish an effective debt restructuring framework. The 
major law reforms include the amendments of the bankruptcy law in 1998, the bankruptcy 
law reforms in 1999, and the establishment of the bankruptcy court in June 1999.  
Corporate Debt Restructurings by CDRAC 
In June 1998, a debt workout framework “the Bangkok Approach,” which was modeled after 
the London Approach, was implemented. To facilitate out-of-court voluntary debt 
restructuring and to develop a framework for corporate debt restructuring, the Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) and the Joint Public-Private Resolution were 
established. The CDRAC is responsible for outlining an efficient debt restructuring procedure 
and overseeing out-of-court debt settlements between corporate debtors and financial 
institutions. The CDRAC’s processes encourage voluntary debt negotiations based on a 
market-oriented approach. The BOT provides numerous incentives for successful debt 
restructurings, such as tax exemptions and land-transfer fee reductions (Dasri, 2002).  
The majority of the cases signing into the CDRAC’s process have been successfully 
completed. Specifically, over the period 1998-2004, 14,358 cases with approximately 1.9   6
trillion baht worth of credits (accounting for 66.7% of all target debtors’ value of credits) 
have gone through the restructuring process. However, 2,653 debtors with outstanding credits 
of around 0.4 trillion baht (14.5%) failed to restructure their debts and have then been taken 
to the court by creditors. These figures represented only the restructuring of small-sized bad 
assets of financial institutions since most of the large debtors were transferred from the 
CDRAC to private asset management companies (AMCs) and the Thai Asset Management 
Company (TAMC) in 2002.
2  
Corporate Debt Restructurings by TAMC 
In June 2001, the TAMC was established to clean up the state banks’ balance sheets by 
taking over all the banks’ NPLs. It was necessary to deal with the impaired assets of banks 
that were transferred from government-owned financial institutions to asset management 
companies. In addition, the TAMC also dealt with the bad loans at private banks. But, these 
NPLs had to be secured and unstructured. The loans had to be held by multiple creditors and 
the amount had to be more than 5 million baht. The TAMC was granted extensive 
enforcement powers to collect loans from the banks’ debtors. The TAMC could demand the 
court to foreclose on the collateral or personal guarantee of loans if debtors did not cooperate 
with the TAMC (Siamwalla, 2001). 
By the third quarter of 2004, the TAMC had acquired 15,491 cases of impaired assets with 
combined book values of 777.2 billion baht. Out of these cases, 14,864 cases with book 
values totaling 629.8 billion baht were transferred from state-owned financial institutions. 
The remaining 1,085 cases with book values totaling 147.4 billion baht were transferred from 
private institutions. Figures 2:1 and 2:2 reveal that the NPLs had been decreasing gradually 
over time. By the end of 2003, the NPLs accounted for approximately 10% of the total loans 
which had been significantly reduced from around 50% in the mid of 1999.
3  
**************************** 
Insert Figure 2:1, Figure 2:2 here 
**************************** 
                                                            
2 AMCs are set up by banks and finance companies and regulated by the Bank of Thailand under the Asset 
Management Company Act B.E. 2541 (A.D. 1998). The primary role of an AMC is to handle non-performing 
assets that were transferred from financial institutions. Impaired assets under the AMCs’ management may be 
resolved through debt restructuring, foreclosure and sale of assets, or legal actions. 
3 From 1998 to December 2002, the NPLs are defined as a loan that has stopped payment on principal and 
interest for at least 3 months, excluding doubtful-of-loss loan with full provisioning. From December 2002, the 
NPLs are defined as loans that are classified as substandard, doubtful, doubtful–of-loss, and loss, including the 
doubtful-of-loss loans having been written off earlier, and were written back.   7
The Ownership Structure of Banks  
This section investigates the ownership of banks. Unlike non-financial firms, banks operate 
under legal and regulatory environments that are substantially different from those of non- 
financial firms. Under the Commercial Bank Act B.E. 2505 (A.D. 1962), a person is allowed 
to hold at most 5% of the shares in a commercial bank.
4 However, the law does not limit the 
ownership by the Crown Property Bureau and other government agencies such as the FIDF. 
Until June 1997, foreign ownership of banks was limited to 25%. After the financial crisis, 
the restrictions were relaxed to allow for foreign ownership of 100% for a period of 10 years. 
Subsequent to that period, foreign investors will not be permitted to acquire additional shares 
and these shares must not be acquired until the ownership stake is maintained below 50% of 
the banks’ total shares.  
To calculate ultimate ownership, we use the standard method suggested by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).  We 
consider four types of shareholders: Family, the Crown Property Bureau (CPB)
5, state, and 
foreign investors. The “state” here includes any government agencies including the MOF, the 
FIDF, the Royal Thai Army, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Air Force.
6  
The information on shareholdings is obtained from the I-SIMS and SETSMART databases 
produced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. We also use the database of the Business 
Online Company (BOL) to trace ultimate ownership of non-listed companies that are 
shareholders of banks.
7 Finally, family relationships were obtained from Anuchitworawong, 
Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2004). 
Table 2:2 presents the identity of the largest shareholder of Thai banks in 1996, 2000, and 
2003. The crisis significantly affected the ownership of the banks. The number of banks was 
reduced from 15 to 13 in 2003 due to bankruptcy, consolidations, recapitalization, and 
emergence of three new banks (Bank Thai, UOB Radanasin Bank, and Thanachart Bank). 
Table 2:3 shows that before the crisis, most of the Thai banks were controlled by families. 
There were only two banks owned by the state and there was no single bank in which a 
foreign investor was the largest shareholder.  
                                                            
4 A person includes his spouse and minor children, as well as a company in which they separately or aggregately 
own more than 30% of the shares. 
5 The CPB is a juristic person established in 1948 under the provision of a special Act of Parliament. It functions 
as the holding company of the Royal Family. 
6 Our definition, therefore, is different from the BOT. While we define Thai Military Bank as a state owned bank 
since its largest shareholders were the Royal Thai Army, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Air Force, the 
BOT considers the bank as privately owned for the fact that the largest shareholder is not the Ministry of 
Finance.    
7 The BOL obtains the right from the Ministry of Commerce to reproduce the company information that is filed 
with the Ministry annually. This database includes all companies in Thailand that have registered with the 
Ministry of Commerce.  
   8
In the post-crisis period, where families were the largest shareholders, there were only five 
banks in 1998, two banks in 1999 and only one bank in 2001-2003. Out of 15 banks in 1996, 
only three banks had their previous largest shareholder remained at the end of 2003. These 
banks were Bank of Ayudhya, the Siam Commercial Bank, and the state owned Krung Thai 
Bank. Among the three banks, the Ratanarak from Bank of Ayudhya is the only founding 
family who had managed to remain the controlling shareholder over the bank. In order to 
keep control on the bank, the Ratanarak sold about 25% of the shares in Siam City Cement to 
Swiss investors (Hewison, 2000). Other founding families who had been controlling 
shareholders of the banks for decades, namely the Sophonpanich (Bangkok Bank), the 
Lamsam (KasikornBank), the Wang Lee (Nakornthon Bank), and the Techapaibul (Bangkok 
Metropolitan Bank), lost the control as major shareholders. The Sophonpanich and the 
Lamsam continued to have their influence over the banks as the top executives and the board. 
Tables 2:4 shows voting rights and cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. The 
ownership of banks became more concentrated in the post-crisis period compared with the 
pre-crisis period. The troubled banks that were nationalized emerged with the government as 
the majority shareholder. Similarly, all of the banks that were acquired by foreign 
institutional investors also turned out to have a high ownership concentration. Shareholdings 
by family, however, had declined significantly. Overall, the voting rights held by a family 
were reduced to less than 4% since 2001.  
******************************************** 
Insert Table 2:2, Table 2:3, Table 2:4, Table 2:5 here 
******************************************** 
Policy Efforts to Enhance Corporate Governance of Banks 
Since the crisis, corporate governance has been the focus of extensive reforms in Thailand. In 
February 2002, the “National Corporate Governance Committee” (NCGC) was established to 
introduce policy measures to improve the level of corporate governance. The NCGC 
appointed six sub-committees. Among them was the Sub-Committee on the Enhancement of 
Corporate Governance in Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, and Insurance 
Companies.
8  In addition, the government introduced numerous measures, guidelines, and 
regulations to improve corporate governance of banks in Thailand. This section reviews these 
policy efforts. 
                                                            
8 The Chairperson of the sub-committee is the Governor of the BOT, and its members include the President of 
Thai Bankers’ Association, the President of Association of Finance companies, Director-General of Department 
of Insurance, and the Assistant Governor of the BOT who leads the Financial Institution Policy Group.   9
Guidelines for Improving the Effectiveness of the Board  
Several initiatives have been launched by the authorities to enhance the effectiveness of the 
board of directors in the Thai commercial banking sector. In March 2002, the BOT issued the 
Financial Institution Directors’ Handbook. The Handbook elucidates the fiduciary duties of 
directors, the role of the board of directors in formulating strategies and policies as well as 
monitoring and overseeing the management, and the expectations of stakeholders such as 
shareholders and depositors. The Handbook also specifies the regulations governing duty of 
care, which if violated, may lead to criminal liabilities and cases of directors’ liability. 
In December 2002, the BOT issued guidelines and rules for the restructuring of the 
composition, qualifications, and responsibilities of the board of directors and sub-committees 
in the banks. The new guidelines require that a board must have at least nine members, out of 
which more than one-third has to be non-executives. In addition, at least three board members 
or one fourth of the members, whichever is higher, must be independent directors.   
An outside independent director has to be a person who (1) is not an employee of the bank, 
(2) does not have a family relationship with top executives and major shareholders of the 
bank, (3) does not directly and indirectly own more than 0.5% of the bank’s shares, and (4) 
does not have direct and indirect interests in related entities of the bank or that of its major 
shareholders.  
Directors cannot be: (1) politically appointed persons, (2) from financial supervising 
institutions, and (3) persons who were removed from public offices due to fraud and 
mismanagement. Directors are not allowed to serve as directors for other banks 
simultaneously. These restrictions, however, can be relaxed with the BOT’s approval. 
Directors are also prohibited from being the Chairperson, executive director, or director with 
signatory authority in more than three business groups.
9 To enhance board monitoring, a 
director is also required to attend at least 50% of the annual board meetings. 
In December 2002, the BOT required that banks have to set up audit and risk management 
committees. The audit committee must have at least three members, two of whom have to be 
independent directors. The Chairperson of the audit committee must not serve as a member of 
other committees. The risk management committee consists of at least five members who 
may come from the bank’s board and/or top management. The committee is to be chaired by 
the bank’s CEO.  
Banks were urged to set up two other committees: nomination and compensation committees 
to oversee the appointment and compensation of directors, committee members, and top 
management. These two committees may have the same members. The number of the 
committee members has to be at least three, and all of the members should be non-executive 
                                                            
9 Until 2003, directors were allowed to assume such positions in no more than three companies.   10
directors. The BOT also advises that the Chairperson of the committees should be an 
outsider. The committees should hold meetings at least twice a year.  
Regulations on Senior Management 
According to the Commercial Banking Act B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979), top executives of banks 
cannot be those who have been dismissed from public offices due to fraud or have been 
through bankruptcy. In November 1997, the BOT issued additional requirements. A bank’s 
top management must have at least five years experience as senior management at established 
financial institutions. In addition, top executives must have a good ethical business 
background with commendable work record and no record of imprisonment. 
Regulations on Information Disclosure 
To enhance transparency and promote effective market discipline, in May 2001 the BOT 
ordered banks to disclose details of the following information. 
(1)  Transactions that are related to a bank’s senior management and companies in which 
they hold at least 10% of the shares. 
(2)  Financial and non-financial compensation and other benefits paid to directors and senior 
management. 
(3)  Non-performing loans (NPLs). 
(4)  Loans to related parties. 
(5)  Violations against the BOT’s rules and regulations, and the amount of fine paid on such 
violations. This information must be disclosed on a monthly basis. 
Guidelines for Internal and External Controls 
Internal Audit and Control 
To improve the effectiveness of internal audit and control procedures, in October 2001 the 
BOT announced guidelines that specify the responsibilities of internal auditors, the scope of 
auditing, and BOT reporting requirements. These guidelines are to be applied to a group-wide 
internal auditor or an outsource of such duty of a commercial bank. In addition, internal 
auditors are encouraged to apply other guidelines for internal control issued by other 
organizations, such as the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), the Stock Exchange of Thailand, and 
the Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand.   11
The guidelines for internal audit and control cover important issues including the procedures 
for receiving, paying and lending, creating contingent liability, investing in securities and 
selling assets. 
Reforms on Accounting Practices 
To improve the accounting standard, the Accounting Act B.E. 2543 (A.D. 2000) was enacted. 
This standard was based on the International Accounting Standard (IAS). The law requires all 
companies operating in Thailand to comply with the new accounting standard. Otherwise, 
they will be penalized. For listed companies, there are additional penalties imposed by the 
Securities and Exchange Act. 
External Audit 
All financial statements of banks must be certified by an external auditor who is approved by 
the BOT. An external auditor must not be a director, officer, or employee of the commercial 
bank. In November 2002, the BOT has further specified qualifications of an external auditor, 
approval criteria, and scope of audit work. A bank must not use the same auditor for more 
than five years. An external auditor is required to provide an annual report on the efficiency 
of the bank’s internal controls, internal auditors’ competency, and unusual lending practices.  
Regulations on Lending to/or Investing in Related Parties 
Under the regulation, banks are prohibited to lend to insiders who are the executives 
(directors and senior management) and major shareholders. Insider also includes his 
immediate family and affiliated companies in which he owns more than 30% of the shares. A 
bank is allowed to lend to or invest in the companies in which the insiders hold less than 30% 
of the shares. However, such transactions must not exceed the limits of 5% of the bank’s tier 
1 capital, 25% of the total liability of such companies, or 50% of such companies’ equity, 
whichever is the lowest. 
Furthermore, directors are also prohibited from guaranteeing any debts, accepting, providing 
aval, and intervening in any bills of which the directors are drawers, makers, or endorsers.  
3.  Roles of Safety Nets and Prudential Regulation   
This section investigates the development of the safety nets since the end of the 1970s until 
the present. Our focuses are on the deposit insurance system and the way financial authorities 
handled troubled banks. We argue that the safety nets gave rise to moral hazard. In addition, 
we investigate the effectiveness of bank supervision by the BOT. We also discuss recent 
reforms in bank supervision that were implemented by the BOT. 
 
   12
Depositor Protection 
Depositor Protection before the 1997 Crisis 
The BOT’s first attempt to implement a systematic framework of deposit insurance was in 
1979 in response to the Raja Finance crisis (Bank of Thailand, 1995; Wesaratchakit, 2001; 
Satitniramai, 2002).
10 The closure of the company caused a deposit run on other finance 
companies and the entire financial system experienced a flow-on negative effect. As an 
immediate measure, the government reimbursed the depositors of Raja Finance with 20% of 
the principal. Then, the basic principles of the Deposit Insurance Institutions of Thailand Act 
were drafted and approved by the Cabinet on June 10, 1980. Unfortunately, the Act was 
blocked by the large banks and finally was withdrawn. The banks strongly opposed two 
issues: (1) the idea of empowering the BOT to intervene financially distressed banks 
including dismissing and replacing the executives and (2) the basis of insurance premium 
calculation (Satitniramai, 2002). 
During 1983-1984, another finance company crisis and bank runs occurred. During this 
period, 20 finance companies were closed down and 25 other finance companies were put in 
the “life-boat” scheme to be rescued by the BOT. Again, the BOT used an ad hoc measure. 
To prevent bank runs, the BOT fully reimbursed depositors of the 20 failed companies the 
face value of their principal, but with no interest.  
Meanwhile, many banks were also experiencing difficulties as a result of mismanagement 
and insider lending. The most serious case was Asia Trust Bank that eventually collapsed in 
September 1984. The bank was nationalized and merged with the state owned Krung Thai 
Bank. In 1985-1987, two more banks, First Bangkok Bank and Siam City Bank, were also in 
distress. The BOT rescued them by providing funding. During 1985-1988, the amount of cash 
injected into the banking system was about one billion baht a year (Bank of Thailand, 1992). 
Again, all depositors were fully reimbursed. 
By this time, the BOT realized that it needed to establish an explicit deposit insurance system 
to deal with bank failures. But, it was again blocked by the MOF (Siamwalla, 2001). By law, 
the BOT is not allowed to grant loans on mortgage of immovable property, or become the 
owner of immovable property other than its own premises, or to grant unsecured loans. So, in 
effect, the BOT could not implement measures to rehabilitate financial institutions. Instead of 
changing the law, the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), was set up in 
November 1985. The FIDF operates as a de facto department of the BOT. The basic function 
of the FIDF is to assist restructuring of troubled financial institutions. Its authority includes: 
(1) providing financial assistance in terms of deposit and low-interest loans to ease liquidity, 
(2) injecting funds in the form of equity (3) taking over financial institutions and liquidating 
bad assets before rehabilitating them, (4) transferring good assets and liabilities of insolvent 
                                                            
10 The Raja Finance was a large finance company that was liquidated due to extending a huge amount of loans to 
its executives to manipulate the company’s share price. The company suffered a severe liquidity crunch when   13
financial institutions to healthy ones, (5) implementing policies to enhance better 
management of troubled financial institutions, and administration of the blanket guarantee 
system since 1997. The FIDF is jointly funded by the financial institutions and the BOT. The 
current premium is 0.2% of a bank’s outstanding deposits.  
There was another unsuccessful attempt to introduce an explicit depositor protection system 
in 1991. A Bill was drafted on the 1981 Deposit Insurance Agency Act and was submitted for 
parliamentary approval. However, the Bill was withdrawn by the MOF (Bank of Thailand, 
1995; Siamwalla, 2001; Wesaratchakit, 2001). Again, financial institutions opposed the idea 
of the BOT having the authority to supervise and resolve distressed financial institutions.  
In summary, until the crisis, Thailand did not have a formal deposit insurance system that 
would arrange for the systematic exit of financial institutions when they are nonviable. The 
financial authorities, however, had handled troubled financial institutions on an ad hoc basis. 
As for depositors, the law did not specify ex ante the terms and conditions of how depositors 
of failed financial institutions would be protected. However, the government had often 
rescued and provided financial support to troubled banks and generally reimbursed depositors 
and sometimes creditors as well. So, de facto the safety net implied a blanket guarantee 
(Siamwalla, 2001) that was made official in 1997. As widely recognized, the presence of a 
blanket guarantee reduces the incentives for insured depositors and creditors to monitor banks 
as they are fully protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strategies employed 
by the bank management. 
The Blanket Guarantee since 1997  
By the beginning of 1996, many financial institutions were in serious financial trouble. The 
first intervention by financial authorities began in May 1996 when there was a run on 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce. The problems escalated in the beginning of 1997. In March 
1997, 10 finance companies were ordered to recapitalize. About three months later, in June 
1997, another 16 finance companies were suspended, and 8 finance companies were ordered 
to recapitalize. To prevent runs on these finance companies and other financial institutions, 
all depositors of these undercapitalized and closed-down companies were reimbursed by the 
FIDF in the form of 3 to 5-year promissory notes at slightly below the market interest rates. 
However, bank runs continued as depositors panicked in the face of continuous bank and 
finance company closures.  
On August 5, 1997, another 42 finance companies were suspended. To stop the bank runs, the 
cabinet issued a blanket guarantee to be implemented through the FIDF on the same day. The 
resolution specified an explicit full protection, in local currency terms, for all depositors and 
non-subordinated creditors of domestic and foreign financial institutions operating in 
Thailand. The guarantee applied only to financial institutions that were not closed or ceased 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the stock price dropped following the collapse of the stock exchange index.    14
making payments. It also covered full principal and full or (under certain conditions) partial 
interest.  
Since the cabinet resolution on the blanket guarantee, the FIDF has made repayments to 
depositors and creditors of one bank, Bangkok Bank of Commerce and five finance 
companies (Bank of Thailand, 2000 and 2003). In November 2003, creditors of all financial 
institutions were excluded from the blanket guarantee. The current blanket guarantee, hence, 
covered only depositors and those who hold promissory notes issued by financial institutions. 
Plans to adopt the System of Limited Deposit Insurance 
The blanket guarantee has no repeal date and can be repealed only if a deposit insurance 
agency is established. As the potential for moral hazards discussed earlier is greater under a 
blanket guarantee, the government has been working on the design of a limited deposit 
insurance scheme since 2000 (Wesaratchakit, 2001; Bank of Thailand, 2003). The plan is 
implemented with technical support from the IMF and the World Bank. In December 2000, a 
committee was created with the responsibility of establishing a Deposit Insurance Agency 
(DIA) and outlining the Deposit Insurance Act. The DIA will take over the task of managing 
deposit insurance from the FIDF and provide a limited deposit guarantee. In addition, the 
DIA is responsible for setting and collecting insurance premiums, managing the insurance 
fund, and resolving nonviable financial institutions. The DIA will assume responsibility for 
resolving the situation once a financial institution is suspended by the BOT. This will 
minimize the costs of redeeming deposits and reduce the amount of reimbursements to 
depositors (Wesaratchakit, 2001; Bank of Thailand, 2002 and 2003).  
The DIA will cover all financial institutions and the coverage limit will be first set at Baht 50 
million (USD 1.17 million) per depositor per financial institution. The limit will be gradually 
reduced to 20 million baht and then to one million baht per depositor per financial institution. 
The DIA is designed to protect small depositors of member financial institutions who account 
for 90% of all depositors in the financial system. Under this plan, guarantees on inter-bank 
deposits are to be removed within one year after the establishment of the DIA.  
To prevent an adverse selection problem, all deposit-taking institutions will be required to be 
members of the DIA. Deposit-taking institutions include domestic commercial banks, 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks, finance companies, and specialized financial 
institutions that take deposits.  
Regarding the funding, the MOF contributes the initial funding of one billion baht to the DIA. 
A target level of the fund size is to be determined. The premiums to be paid by each member 
of the DIA are calculated as a certain percentage of total deposits taken by each member. 
Currently, it is known that the rate is a flat rate of 0.4%. The DIA’s board has the discretion 
to lower the premiums whenever it is considered appropriate. But this could only happen 
after the target size of the fund is reached, and the initial contribution by the government is   15
repaid. It is planned that the premium will be set at a flat rate up to the point whereby the risk 
rating system is adequately developed (Wesaratchakit, 2001).  
The FIDF as the Lender-of-Last Resort 
The BOT had served as “lender of the last resort” for distressed financial institutions until the 
establishment of the FIDF in 1985. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the basic function of the 
FIDF is to facilitate the rehabilitation of troubled financial institutions. However, the FIDF 
was severely criticized for being overly generous in its assistance. Instead of charging a 
higher penalty rate when lending to the troubled banks, the FDIF always charged interest at 
well below the market rates. Given this fact, many scholars argued that the FIDF functioned 
as the “lender of the first resort” (Siamwalla, 2001; Thanapornpun, 2002).  
The FIDF was also severely criticized during the crisis for lacking an overall plan for the 
development of the financial sector. In addition to bailing out financial institutions that were 
imprudent with excessive connected lending, the FIDF was extremely generous in extending 
unlimited funds to finance companies whose assets were in such a dire state that they could 
never regain the solvency needed to repay the loans (Nukul Commissions, 1998).  
The FIDF was also accused of being unable to distinguish between financial institutions that 
were in trouble and those that were not in trouble. It turned out that many financial 
institutions that were not in need of assistance manipulated the scheme to their advantage 
(Siamwalla, 2001; Thanapornpun, 2002). For example, in December 1998, the BOT and the 
FIDF prosecuted Thai Capital Finance and Securities Company and its four executives for 
misleading the authorities. Apparently, the company provided fake documents to convince 
the authorities that it was in financial distress and hence needed financial assistance. The 
FIDF accepted the claims at face value and provided soft loans to the company six times, 
from June 30, 1997 to October 3, 1997. The loans added up to 213.9 million baht. 
The FIDF’s practice of rescuing troubled banks has implied that the government has never 
wanted to let a bank fail. The no failure norm or the “too-big-too-fail” norm has created 
moral hazard problems in the Thai banking system. For insured bank managers, the promise 
of government assistance provided incentives to shirk and not to prudently manage the risk of 
their loan assets. 
Bank Insolvency Procedure 
In Thailand, bank insolvency procedures are specified in the Commercial Banking Act B.E. 
2505 (A.D. 1962). The BOT may order a bank to rectify its condition or operation if it is 
found that the operation of such bank causes damage to the public interest.
11 The BOT may 
also order a distressed bank to increase or reduce its capital. The BOT also has the power to 
                                                            
11 However, no description of the condition or operation that causes damage to the public interest is provided in 
the law. Hence, how to define such condition or operation depends a lot on the judgment of the authorities.   16
remove the bank’s executives. However, the Minister of Finance has the sole power to take 
over, withdraw the license, and liquidate a bank.  
When a distressed bank is placed under the control of the authorities, the executives will be 
removed and replaced by a Control Committee. The committee is appointed by the Minister 
and consists of a chairperson and at least two other members. The chairperson will represent 
the bank. If the committee considers that the distressed bank is able to continue its business 
operation, the Minister may order the release of the bank. Otherwise, the bank will be 
liquidated.   
Liquidation of a bank is conducted under the provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code 
relating to the liquidation of a limited liability company. In addition to the transfer of power 
and duty of the general meeting to the Minister, any expenses and remuneration brought by 
the control or liquidation of a bank will be paid out from the assets of that bank. 
Typically, the intervention is conducted by the three government agencies namely the BOT, 
the FIDF, and the MOF. A distressed bank would be ordered to increase its capital and to 
write off losses and provision for bad debt. Then, the government provides soft loans, injects 
new capital, and installs a new management team. In effect, such bank will be technically 
nationalized. Subsequently, the bank may be merged with a state-owned bank or resold to 
strategic partners. Since the 1970s, only two banks (Asia Trust Bank and Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce) have been liquidated under the Commercial Banking Act B.E. 2505 (A.D. 1962). 
In both cases, the banks’ licenses were withdrawn.  
The Strength of Prudential Supervision 
In this section, we discuss the strength of the BOT as financial supervisors who rely upon the 
BOT’s independence from politics and influences by commercial bankers. We also address 
reform measures geared to enhancing the effectiveness of prudential supervision over 
financial institutions. 
The Central Bank Independence  
Theoretically, a supervisor is independent if it can be insulated from or is able to resist 
pressure and influence to modify supervisory practices in order to advance a policy agenda 
that is at odds with the maintenance of a safe and sound banking system. In the Thai context, 
the factors that have been considered to undermine supervisory independence include 
interference by politics and the owners of commercial banks. We review legal aspects in 
order to understand the relationship between the BOT and politics and commercial bankers. 
The BOT has multiple objectives, namely conducting monetary policy, recommending 
economic policy, acting as banker to the government and financial institutions, providing 
lender of last resort facilities, supervising financial institutions, managing international 
reserves, and issuing bank notes. The upside of having multiple objectives is that it facilitates   17
information flow. In particular, having information on the solvency and liquidity of banks in 
a timely manner is crucial in times of financial crisis (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). On 
the other hand, there may be conflicts of interest that can hamper central bank effectiveness 
and dilute accountability. For example, too loose a monetary policy may have unintended 
adverse effects on bank earnings and credit quality. In addition, the wider the role of the 
central bank, the more it could become subject to political pressures, thus threatening its 
independence (Briault, 1999). Based on these arguments, Thanapornpun (2002) argued that 
the BOT should not be responsible for bank supervision. 
Bank of Thailand versus MOF 
The BOT has been governed by the Bank of Thailand Act B.E. 1942 and the Royal Decree 
regulating the affairs of the Bank of Thailand B.E. (1942). By law, the BOT is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The nomination, appointment, and dismissal of the 
Governor and the Deputy Governor are done by the King upon the recommendation of the 
Minister of Finance and then approved by the cabinet. There is no definite term of office for 
the position of the Governor and the causes for his/her dismissal are not specified in the Act.  
The MOF has the authority over the BOT with regard to bank supervision. The BOT is 
required to obtain approval from the MOF for implementation of major instruments including 
setting up the legal reserve ratio and the capital adequacy ratio. In effect, the BOT is 
accountable to the MOF and not to the general public. This institutional design, therefore, 
leaves the Governor with only one option that is to resign or face dismissal, should conflict 
arise between the government and the BOT. Indeed, Table 3:1 shows that five out of 19 
governors over the past 60 years were dismissed or pressured to resign. The most recent case 
was the previous Governor, M.R. Chatu Mongol Sonakul, who was relieved of his position as 
a result of disagreement over interest rate policy with the Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra.  
Since 2000 the BOT has been trying to propose amendments to the Act to enhance the 
independence of the BOT (see Malakul na Ayudhya, 2002). In this proposal, the role of the 
BOT would be limited to maintaining price stability and the financial system. The Governor  
would be selected by a nominating committee appointed by the Cabinet. His term would be 
five years and may be extended only once. The causes for removal would be clearly specified 
and would be limited to cases of inefficiency. The Court of Directors will also be empowered 
as a check-and-balance to the Governor. The proposed legislative reform would also 
empower the BOT as the financial system supervisor. The BOT would be authorized to issue 
bank licenses, set new supervision rules, and impose penalties on financial institutions 
without the approval from the MOF.  
However, since the draft has to be enacted by the parliament, it is widely thought that the 
MOF is likely to oppose it in order to maintain its power over the BOT. Perhaps under this   18
environment, the BOT can be independent from political influences only by having integrity, 
credibility, and capability (Satitniramai, 2002; Thanapornpun, 2002).  
********************* 
Insert Table 3:1 here 
********************* 
Bank of Thailand: Challenge against Krung Thai Bank 
In this section, we review a rare incidence of the BOT acting as a tough financial supervisor. 
The saga over at Krung Thai Bank (KTB) is a case in point. In early 2004, the BOT reviewed 
the loan portfolios of KTB and ordered the bank to reclassify about 46 billion baht ($1.1 
billion USD) worth of doubtful loans that had been extended to 12 companies. As a result, a 
total of 12.3% of its loans would be considered as non-performing as of the end of June, up 
from 7.7% percent at the end of March. The BOT later singled out KTB for lax lending 
standards. The Minister of Finance, Somkid Jatusripitak, directed the bank to set up a special 
committee to review these controversial loans. The committee determined that the acting 
president Viroj Nualkhair and other top executives were not involved. However the BOT was 
not convinced, and had maintained its allegations against Viroj and called for him to be held 
accountable for failing to adequately supervise the bank’s lending practices. This prompted 
the BOT Governor to resist the government’s reappointment of Viroj as the president of KTB 
for a second term on September 9, 2004. At the same time, the BOT also disqualified eight 
former directors and managers of KTB. The BOT won the first round.  
The Minister of Finance, however, lent his full support to Viroj’s reinstatement. It was 
actually the Minister of Finance who appointed Viroj in 2001 and again in September, 2004. 
Also, KTB has been a key player in Thaksin’s strategy to boost domestic growth known as 
“Thaksinomics.” It remains to be seen whether the BOT Governor can remain independent 
from political interventions. 
The Influences of Commercial Bankers on the Bank of Thailand 
Satitniramai (2002) argued that the bankers had immense power over the financial 
supervisory authority during the period 1942-1997. The bankers lobbied the MOF as well as 
the BOT officials via the powerful Thai Banker Association. The bankers’ influence on the 
BOT had undermined its supervisory role. For example, when the BOT tried to impose the 
prudential standard capital adequacy ratio in 1962, 1979, and 1992, the bankers negotiated for 
lower ratios and won every time. In 1992, the Thai Banker Association managed to have the 
capital adequacy ratio reduced from the original requirement ratio of 8% to 7%, and the 
second tier capital reduced from the original requirement ratio of 3% to 2%.   19
In addition, due to opposition by the bankers, the BOT had failed a number of times to 
institute a comprehensive framework to cope with bank failures (see Section 3.1.1). The BOT 
obtained the legal power to handle bank failures very gradually. In 1985, the BOT was 
granted the power to dismiss and replace the executives of failed banks. It was not until 
October 1997 that the BOT was given the legal power to merge a failed bank with others.  
The bankers were so influential that they blocked the BOT from introducing the rule-based 
free entry policy. From 1966 to 1997, no single new commercial bank license was granted. 
As a result, the banking industry had long been highly concentrated in the hands of a few 
influential families. 
The Thai Banker Association is likely to be less influential over the BOT after the crisis. The 
major factor is the tremendous changes in the ownership structure of the commercial banks 
(see Section 2). The banking industry is no longer controlled by a few influential families. 
Reforms of the Financial Institution Supervision Practices 
In this section, we review major reforms of the supervisory framework that have been 
implemented since 1997. Following the study by the World Bank conducted in 1998-1999, 
the BOT has been implementing the following measures:  
(1)  Legal reforms. To provide an effective supervisory framework, the BOT reformed the 
laws by combining the Commercial Banking Act and the Act on the undertaking of 
Finance Business, Securities Businesses and Credit Foncier Businesses. The new 
Financial Institutions Act provides a uniform standard of supervisions on all financial 
institutions and gives the BOT the sole responsibility for financial institution 
supervision. 
(2)  Revision of regulatory guidelines to be consistent with the Basel Committee Core 
Principles for effective supervision. The guidelines focus on risk management, sound 
management, and transparent, timely and adequate information disclosure. 
(3)  Consolidated supervision. The BOT is in the process of having enacted the Financial 
Businesses Act that will empower the BOT to monitor financial institutions on a 
consolidated basis. The consolidated supervision framework became essential in 
response to the universal banking business that allows banks to undertake leasing, 
insurance, securities business via subsidiaries and affiliates. 
(4)  The establishment of a credit bureau and the enactment of the Credit Bureau Act in 
November 2002, which became effective in March 2003. The Credit Bureau facilitates 
information sharing among financial institutions, thereby improving their credit risk 
management.   20
(5)  The plan to establish a Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) and clear guidelines for 
resolving distressed financial institutions. Also important is the implementing of 
strategies for replacing the blanket guarantee by a limited deposit guarantee. The DIA 
will also replace the FIDF over the task of administrating deposit insurance. 
(6)  Restructuring the Supervision Group. The Financial Institutions Policy Board was 
established to oversee regulatory policies. The Financial Institutions Development 
Board will promote the standardization of supervisory practices. 
The Establishment of the Supervision Group 
The Supervision Group, which is responsible for supervising commercial banks and other 
financial institutions, was reorganized in 2001. The group composes of six departments: 
planning and development, financial institutions applications and special examination, risk 
management and information system examination, financial institutions monitoring and 
analysis, on-site examination 1, and on-site examination 2.  
Since 1999, the approach of supervision and examination of banks has become more market 
based and focused on corporate governance, risk management and internal control. The 
procedure involves off-site and on-site examination. The off-site examination serves as an 
integral part of the overall supervision process. The off-site process, which conducts quarterly 
reports, serves as an early warning system to change and improve the condition of an 
individual bank.  
When serious problems are found, a discussion with the top management of the financial 
institution is held. The off-site process is integrated with the on-site examination process by 
participating in the pre-examination phase to develop the scope of on-site examination. In this 
preliminary analysis, the information obtained from internal and external auditors is also 
used. To facilitate the on-site examination, the compliance examination is undertaken by the 
compliance examiners. After the on-site examination, banks are rated according to its 
aggregate level of risk in relation to its strategic risk, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, 
and operational risk.  The frequency of the on-site visit depends on the soundness of banks 
and rating. Banks with high ratings from 1-4 is subject to an on-site examination once a year. 
Banks with the lowest rating of 5, however, will be intervened and closely monitored. The 
working time and the number of examination staff vary with the size of banks. A preliminary 
analysis prior to commencing an examination takes about 20, 15, or 10 days for respectively 
large, medium, or small banks. An on-site examination takes about 40, 30, and 20 days for 
large, medium, and small banks, respectively. The number of examination staff is about 18, 
12, or 10 for respectively large, medium, or small banks.   21
The Supervisory Staff 
The BOT established an Examiner School in 1999 to train the supervising staff. The first 
group of qualified examiners completed their training around the end of 2001. Job rotation 
within the supervision group is also used for training purposes.  
The supervision group of the BOT has been staffed by capable and qualified examiners; and 
because of the status and its competitive pay system, the BOT has never had problems in 
recruiting smart people. The BOT has a number of staff holding graduate degrees from well-
known foreign and domestic universities. In addition, since the 1960s, the BOT has a 
scholarship program that provides financial support to promising students and its staff to 
study at internationally renowned universities.  
4.  Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Besides safety nets of the financial system and market discipline in the banking sector, 
internal corporate governance mechanisms are as important in shaping sound corporate 
governance of banks. Due to the unique characteristics of banks, there should be some 
different measures to enhance internal governance mechanisms of banks compared to non-
financial companies. As for Thai banks, the financial supervisory authorities focused on the 
effectiveness of the board of directors, the establishment of new committees, the 
qualifications of directors and top executives, the nomination and compensation of 
management, the improvement of internal control system and risk management practices, and 
the quality of information disclosure. So far, all banks have technically met the minimum 
requirements. Despite this, corporate governance of Thai banks is still lower than the 
international standard. 
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms 
focusing on the board of directors system, executive compensation, internal control, and 
disclosure and transparency. We also evaluate the policy efforts to enhance corporate 
governance of banks taken since the crisis. We use the information from the annual report of 
a bank to clarify the characteristics of its board. This source of data allows us to analyze 13 
banks that were operating during 2001-2003. In addition, we conducted a survey that was 
based on 12 banks that were operating in the summer of 2004. Our survey questionnaires 
included the following five issues: the effectiveness of the board of directors, the executive 
compensation scheme, the risk management practices, the internal control system, and the 
disclosure policy.  
The questionnaires were responded by an executive director, independent director, officer in 
charge of executive compensation, officer in charge of risk management, and the corporate 
secretary of the bank. Out of 12 banks, 11 banks responded.
12 Among the 11 banks, two 
                                                            
12 Note that we could not get responses from Thai Military Bank and DBS Thai Danu Bank. In September 2004, 
the two banks merged with the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand to become Thai Military Bank.   22
banks did not answer all the questionnaires. The Bank of Asia was taken over by the United 
Overseas Bank during the summer 2004 while we were conducting the survey. So, we could 
not have the questionnaires to be responded by the bank’s executive director. Another bank 
did not respond to the questionnaires on executive compensation.  
Effectiveness of the Board of Directors and Other Committees 
Board of directors is a widely documented corporate governance mechanism, particularly in 
an economy where legal investors’ protection is relatively weak. For banks in which 
information asymmetries are greater, effective board of directors is vital for good corporate 
governance.  We evaluate the effectiveness of the banks’ board by investigating the 
characteristics of all the board members including the Chairperson, the CEO, and other 
members, and how the board functions. We also discuss the role and functions of the board of 
directors; and analyze the characteristics of board’s audit, risk, and nomination committees. 
General Characteristics of the Board of Directors  
The board characteristics of the Thai commercial banks, their size and composition, can be 
summarized as follow (Table 4:1).  
(1)    Board size: The average board size increased from 10.9 in 2001 to 11.9 in 2003, which 
is larger than the minimum requirement of nine.   
(2)    The number of independent directors: The average number of independent directors was 
3.5, in 2001, and 3.9 in 2002 and 2003, which is higher than the legal requirement of 
three or one fourth of the total. 
(3)    The proportion of executive directors: Executive directors accounted for about one-third 
of the board, which is the maximum number allowed by the regulation.  
(4)    The incidence of founding family members on the board: In Bank of Ayudhya, Bangkok 
Bank and Kasikorn Bank, members of the founding families remained as either the 
Chairperson or the CEO of the banks in all three years.  
(5)    Foreign directors: The share of foreign directors increased from 16% in 2001 to 19% in 
2003 due to increase in foreign ownership. In 2003, around one quarter of the banks had 
foreign executive directors and about one third of the banks had foreign non-executive 
directors. Of those surveyed, 31% of the banks had foreign independent directors. In 
three foreign owned banks, the representatives of the largest shareholder served as the 
Chairman and CEO. They also held a majority of the board.  
(6)   Education background: On average, the education level of directors was about 
bachelor’s degree in 2001 and 2002. In 2003, directors had, on average, a master’s 
degree in 2003.    23
(7)   The number of boards a director served on: On average, a director served in more than 
one board. In 2003, the average number of other non-listed companies where a director 
simultaneously served was 0.57. On average, a director simultaneously served on the 
boards of 1.65 listed companies. So, the board members were not over stretched. The 
number was significantly lower than the limit of three business groups set by the BOT. 
(8)  The incidence of the Chairperson and CEO being the same person: In only one bank, 
Bank of Ayudhya, the founding family and controlling shareholder, has served as both 
the Chairperson and CEO.  
 
Background of the Chairpersons, CEOs 
Table 4:2 shows the background of the Chairpersons and CEOs as of 2003.  We find that it is 
rarely the case that the Chairperson and CEO were former officers of financial supervisory 
agencies or former politicians. Regarding educational background, the CEOs had, on average, 
a higher education level than the Chairperson. In the majority of banks, the CEO had a 
master’s degree. Most of the Chairpersons and CEOs had a degree in finance or economics. 
None had a degree in accounting.  
Regarding nationality, there were two banks where both the Chairperson and the CEO were 
foreigners. Both banks were foreign owned, namely DBS Thai Danu Bank and UOB 
Radansadin Bank. 
Background of Other Directors   
Table 4:3 shows the characteristics of board members using the data of 2003. The board 
members are classified into two groups: independent directors and other directors.  
(1) Independent directors. The evidence shows that independent directors were predominant 
financiers, former central bankers, former and current officers of government agencies (non 
MOF), and academics. Out of 13 banks, three banks had independent directors who were 
former officers of the BOT. One bank had an independent director who was formerly from 
the MOF. In four banks, at least one of the independent directors was from a government 
agency (non MOF). In another five banks, at least one independent director was a former 
officer of a government agency (non MOF).  
Besides the government agencies, we find that in three banks there was at least one 
independent director from another financial institution. There were professors or researchers 
acting as independent directors of three banks. There was no single bank in which the 
independent directors were from the banks’ affiliated companies. 
Independent directors had educational backgrounds that related to the banking sector. Except 
in one bank, we find that independent directors have backgrounds in finance or economics.    24
(2) Other directors. Here, we analyze board members who were not independent directors. 
Insiders were prevalent on the board. On average, there were about 2.1 persons per board 
who were insiders. We also find that in 12 out of 13 banks, there was at least one director 
who was an employee of the bank. In addition, there were about 1.9 persons per board who 
were employees of the banks’ affiliates.  
We find that there were former officers of the BOT, the MOF, and other government 
agencies on the boards. Former BOT officers were on the board of two banks, and former 
MOF officers served on the boards of three banks. In six banks there were former officers of 
other government agencies besides the BOT and the MOF on the board. 
As for state owned banks, we find that the BOT and the MOF had acting officers on the 
board. In six banks, the current employees of the BOT were on the board. The current 
employees of the MOF were in the board of four banks. We also find that in four banks there 
was at least one director who was from government agencies other than the BOT and the 
MOF. 
Regarding the educational background, the board members were highly educated. More than 
50% of the board members have a master’s degree, and about 8% of the board members have 
a doctoral degree. The remaining members have a bachelor’s degree. About 48% of the board 
members have a degree in finance, economics, or accounting. About 10% of directors have 
backgrounds in law.  
Concerning nationality, it is not common for Thai banks to have foreign directors. There were 
six banks in which foreigners served on the board. On average, the share of foreign directors 
on the board was 23%. 
************************************* 
Insert Table 4:1, Table 4:2, Table 4:3 here 
************************************* 
Committees 
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of audit, risk, and nomination and 
compensation committees. Table 4:4 shows our investigation based on the data of 2003. 
(1) The audit committee. The average number of committee members and independent 
members was 3.3 and 3.1, respectively. So, all banks complied with the rule regarding the 
number of committee members.  
Regarding the background of the members, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
requires that at least one of the audit committee members should have finance or accounting 
background. In 12 out of 13 banks, there was at least one committee member with   25
accounting/financing expertise. On average, the number of committee members with this 
qualification was 2.2. Interestingly, although it is not mandatory that the audit committee be 
chaired by an independent director, in all banks the Chairperson of the committee was an 
independent director. 
(2) The risk management committee. It should be noted that due to the unavailability of 
information, we could not cover all the banks. Only seven banks (accounting for 54% of all 
banks) disclosed the names of the committee members in the annual report, while only five 
banks (accounting for 39% of the banks) disclosed also the background of the members. 
On average, the number of committee members was 8.1, which complied with the BOT rule 
of at least five. Most of the committee members were the bank’s executives from different 
departments and were not on the board of directors. Out of the seven banks that disclosed the 
names of the committee members, six banks had their CEO or managing director as the 
Chairperson of the committee, which was consistent with the suggestion by the BOT.  
 (3) The nomination and compensation committees. There are 11 banks that set up these 
committees, accounting for 85% of the banks. All the banks with the nomination committee 
voluntarily disclosed member information. On average the committee consisted of 3.4 
members, which are higher than the legal requirement of 3. All committee members were 
also on the bank’s board. In approximately 64% of the banks with a nomination committee, 
the Chairperson was an independent director, which complied with the BOT’s 
recommendation.  
We find that the average number of committee meetings was 4.56 per year which was more 
often than the BOT’s suggestion of two meetings a year. Note that there were two banks in 
which the committee had only one meeting in a year.  
Regarding the compensation committee, the survey result showed that all banks with the 
compensation committee disclosed information on the members. In eight banks, the members 
of the compensation and nomination committees were the same. The average number of 
compensation committee members was 3.8. The committee members also served as board 
members. Similar to the nomination committee, in about 64% of the banks that had a 
compensation committee, an independent director was the Chairperson of the committee. The 
committee members met, on average 3.78 times a year, which was more often than twice as 
recommended by the BOT.  
********************* 
Insert Table 4:4 here 
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Board Meetings 
The BOT has no specific rules regarding the number of board meetings to be held annually. 
Based on our survey, banks held board meetings quite often. Eight banks (accounting for 
73% of the surveyed banks) had at least one board meeting per month. Out of the other three 
banks, one bank held eight meetings a year and the other two banks held four meetings a year 
(one meeting every quarter). Overall, the average number of board meetings was 11 per year.  
We find that Thai banks had the average attendance rate significantly higher than the legal 
minimum of 50%. In eight surveyed banks, the attendance rate was 90-100%, while in two 
banks the rate was 80-90%.  
Regarding the board meeting minutes, banks had very detailed minutes. The survey shows 
that all banks replied that they had very detailed minutes for all the board meetings. With the 
exception of two banks, directors’ positions on the board meeting agenda were also recorded 
in the minutes. 
In general, independent directors replied that they were given chances to discuss corporate 
matters without being interfered with by the bank’s management. In 10 banks, independent 
directors responded that they had other separate meetings without management several times 
a year. In the remaining one bank, independent directors had their separate meetings only 
once or twice a year.  
In the bank where the CEO was also the Chairperson, independent directors appeared to be 
inactive. It was also not common for independent directors to alter the meeting agenda that 
had been set by the Chairperson. In around 55% of surveyed banks, independent directors had 
never or rarely done so. In addition, independent directors rarely disapproved the agenda 
items. Specifically, in 64% of the banks independent directors had never disapproved agenda 
items at a meeting, and in 18% of the banks independent directors hardly disapproved the 
agenda items. There were only two banks where independent directors appeared to show 
some bravery when they sometimes disapproved the agenda items. Overall, our impression 
was that independent directors did not challenge the management. 
The Role of the Board of Directors 
The literature suggests that a good board should represent shareholders, both minority and 
controlling shareholders, and aim to maximize shareholders’ wealth. In the banking sector, 
the board of directors should also consider the security of depositors’ investment. The results 
based on our survey are consistent with this view. In particular, on average, responding 
independent directors ranked that when making corporate decisions, the board should be 
most accountable to minority shareholders and then depositors. Controlling shareholders 
were ranked the last one after minority shareholders and depositors. The ranking by 
responding executive directors was slightly different, however. They viewed that the board 
should be most accountable to depositors, then to the controlling shareholders and the   27
minority shareholders, in that order. On the other hand, all respondents agreed that 
management was at the bottom of whom the board should be most accountable to.  
Moreover, the respondents viewed that directors represented all  shareholders, and their 
primary role was to maximize the benefits of all shareholders. At the same time, most of 
them did not agree that directors represented controlling shareholders.  
All respondents also agreed that directors should consider the interests of all stakeholders, 
including employees and creditors. Moreover, they responded that directors should ensure the 
bank’s safety and soundness even at the sacrifice of the shareholders’ interests.  
Functions of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors is expected to serve various functions. According to the survey, the 
respondents believed that the board effectively performed the following tasks: formulating 
long-term strategies, establishing and monitoring the risk management and internal control 
system, monitoring and assessing the process of business operations, overseeing potential 
conflicts of interest, ensuring the integrity of the bank’s financial reporting, ensuring the 
qualification of board members, and conducting corporate governance in a transparent 
manner. However, the board’s role in selecting, monitoring and replacing CEO, and 
reviewing executive and non-executive compensation seemed to be limited. Overall, 
surveyed directors regarded their board as a forum of serious discussion for significant 
corporate matters. None of the respondents deemed that the board was perfunctory or 
functioned like a “rubber stamp”.  
It is necessary for (outside) directors to obtain adequate support in order to perform effective 
functions. The survey revealed that the banks supplied sufficient information in time to be 
digested before a board meeting. The banks also provided directors with insurance for any 
personal liability. However, banks did not quite provide funding for the board to obtain 
outside professional services and training. More precisely, only three out of 11 responding 
banks permitted independent directors to acquire the services at the bank’s expense and two 
banks provided substantial mandatory training programs for directors. Nevertheless, all banks 
assigned a contact person to be responsible for the support of outside directors.   
Nomination and Replacement of Top Management and Board Members 
State controlled banks have traditionally been influenced by the government in relation to 
nominating procedure. Specifically, we find that in three out of four state controlled banks, 
the nomination committee existed and one out of these three banks also had transparent 
written rules about the selection of outside directors. However, when it came to practice, one 
half of the surveyed directors from state controlled banks agreed that the government had the 
strongest voice in the CEO selection or dismissal. The other half viewed that the 
board/nomination committee was most influential. As for the selection or dismissal of outside 
directors, all respondents agreed that the government had the most significant impact.   28
For other banks, the board and controlling shareholders played an important role in 
nominating the CEO. Among 10 directors responding to the question about this view, six 
directors indicated that the bank’s board had the strongest voice in selecting the CEO, while 
the other three and one director named controlling shareholders and the government, 
respectively. Regarding the selection of outside directors, the rules were explicitly written in 
five out of eight surveyed banks. In practice, 11 out of 13 directors who responded to the 
question viewed that the board dominated this process. 
Although the board appeared to have an influence on nominating the CEO and outside 
directors, it had virtually no say on dismissing the bank’s executives. More precisely, we find 
that except in one bank, the surveyed banks indicated no case in which the board of directors 
had ever removed key executives. 
Minority shareholders seemed to have an insignificant impact on recommending director 
candidates. Around 45% of surveyed banks revealed that although minority shareholders 
could nominate director candidates at a shareholders’ meeting, it was rarely done. The other 
55% of the banks indicated that minority shareholders were not able to do so. Furthermore, 
cumulative voting practice was not recognized in 82% of the banks.  
Evaluation and Compensation of CEO and Directors 
The CEO of the majority of Thai banks was subjected to an official performance evaluation. 
Around 70% of surveyed banks responded that there was formal procedure and criteria for 
evaluating the performance of the CEO. Only in 36% of the banks outside directors were not 
reviewed in the same manner.  
Regarding executive compensation, only in seven banks (accounting for 68% of surveyed 
banks), the board or compensation committee reviewed the CEO compensation. The survey 
results showed that none of the CEOs and executives was offered stock-based compensation. 
Also, the CEOs and executives did not hold substantial shares. The only exception was Bank 
of Ayudhya where the controlling shareholder was the CEO.  
To the question whether or not the CEO compensation was related to the bank’s performance, 
we got responses from only eight out of 11 banks accounting for 73% of surveyed banks. 
These eight banks indicated that there were specific performance objectives. Only five banks, 
however, answered that the CEO compensation was clearly linked with performance 
measures. The survey therefore showed that the CEO compensation was somewhat related to 
the bank’s performance.  
Regarding the pay to directors, banks did not reward the board members individually. We 
find that only 36% of surveyed banks paid the directors based on performance of individuals. 
Similar to the CEO compensation, no banks offered their directors stock-based compensation. 
Directors held insignificant or no shares in the banks.   29
In general, directors replied that they were satisfied with the compensation. Ten out of 11 
responding independent directors were satisfied with the current compensation. However, six 
respondents did not consider that their compensation gave them adequate financial incentive 
to maximize the interests of all stakeholders.  
Executive directors’ responses were different. Although seven out of 10 responding executive 
directors were content with the compensation they had received, almost all of them agreed 
that they were provided with adequate financial incentive to maximize the interests of 
shareholders as well as other stakeholders. 
Ensuring Internal Control, Disclosure and Transparency  
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control system including risk 
management, external and internal audits, and information disclosure. Internal control system 
is an important element of internal governance mechanisms, especially in the banking 
industry where risk exposure is relatively high. Also, because of the opaqueness of bank loan 
portfolios, high standards of accounting and auditing are necessary for effective risk 
management. 
Internal Control and Risk Management 
The survey indicates that in all banks, the board of directors regularly performed the 
following internal controls: discussing with management about the effectiveness of internal 
control systems, reviewing the evaluation of internal controls, checking whether concerns 
expressed by auditors and supervisory authorities on internal controls being addressed by 
management, and reviewing the appropriateness of the bank’s risk limits.  
The board and the management team usually received adequate and timely information 
regarding internal controls. More precisely, all surveyed banks answered that they required 
regular presentations and performance reports on progress toward strategic goals to the board 
and/or senior management. Eight banks (accounting for 73% of surveyed banks) considered 
that the communication from the board to senior management was fast. The remaining three 
banks considered it to be moderate.  
In relation to review of the bank’s risk limits, all surveyed banks had a process for reviewing 
compliance with limits on risk exposures. Banks often required risk exposure reports from the 
management. On average, the most frequently made reports were of “market risk” exposure. 
In almost 65% of surveyed banks, the board ultimately approved the strategy and major 
policies on measuring/managing overall risks. 
Regarding  credit risk management, written credit policies and procedures in all but one 
surveyed bank covered most of the key items recommended by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. Likewise, all banks generally considered an assessment of all of the   30
relevant elements stipulated by the Basel Committee. In addition, we find that in most banks 
significant loans to related parties needed approval by the board and/or report to the BOT. 
As for market risk management, all surveyed banks had the top management to directly 
handle and maintain market risk management standards, reporting process, and internal 
control system. Similar to credit risk management, all banks adopted policies and procedure 
for limiting and controlling market risks that covered most of relevant areas suggested by the 
Basel Accord.   
Regarding operational risk management, nine banks (accounting for 82% of surveyed banks) 
had operational risk managed and reported internally as a separate risk category. Banks 
seemed to prefer simpler but less accurate tools in identifying and assessing operational risks 
to those that are more accurate and complicated. More precisely, key risk indicators (used by 
82% of surveyed banks), self-management or risk-management (73%), risk mapping (64%), 
and thresholds or limits (64%) were more widely used by the banks than scorecards (36%) 
and measurement of exposure (46%). However, almost all banks applied operational risk 
management systems of the Basel Accord.  
External and Internal Audits 
Qualified external auditors are necessary for banks to maintain reliable internal control 
systems. In general, we find that all banks complied with the relevant BOT’s rules. In relation 
to external auditing, all banks, aside from the two state controlled banks, used one of the “Big 
Four” audit firms. The two state controlled banks were audited by the state audit agency, 
“Office of the Auditor General” which audits state owned enterprises. Regarding accounting 
standards, all banks had those comparable with the international standards. 
All banks had an audit committee to assist the board in overseeing the financial reporting 
process and internal control system. The survey shows that the audit committee of all but one 
bank selected or recommended external auditors. The committee also conducted a proper 
review of external auditors’ work. Moreover, the audit committee typically approved the 
appointment of internal auditors and supervised them as well. 
We find that in the majority of the banks, all committee members were outside independent 
directors; and around 70% of the committee members had finance background. The 
committee was always chaired by an independent director. 
The audit committee held a meeting at least once every quarter. The average number of 
meetings is 8.6 per year. Among the banks, the audit committee in state controlled banks held 
the meetings most often, which was at least once a month. Minutes were written in all but one 
surveyed bank.    31
The banks commonly had written rules governing overall audit functions. Such rules were 
evident in all but one bank. All surveyed banks also had an internal audit department that 
reported to the audit committee. 
Information Disclosure  
We find that in general banks followed the disclosure rules of the BOT. However, there was 
some important information that was not publicly available. The survey shows that 82% of 
the banks had a formal disclosure policy on financial condition and performance. All banks 
disclosed quarterly and annual financial statements in a consolidated basis. The information 
was disclosed in the annual report and available at the bank’s website.  
Information on self-dealing (related-party) transactions, major contingent liabilities, 
substantial changes in the ownership, risk management policies, and director compensation 
was disclosed in the annual report and the report to the BOT and the SET. Only limited 
information on those issues was disclosed on the bank’s web page. We find that disclosure on 
risk exposure of Thai banks was inadequate compared with the requirements of the New 
Basel Capital Accord. 
The information on governance structures and policies was included in the annual report and 
also on the website of four banks. Nevertheless, only 46% of the banks disclosed the extent to 
which the bank’s corporate governance practices conformed to the established standards. The 
information on the board and top management structures was available in the annual report 
and the website. The details of the background of directors and senior management were 
available only in the annual report. 
Regarding executive compensation disclosure, all banks basically complied with the 
requirements of the stock exchange. They disclosed an aggregate amount of compensation of 
all directors and the top 15 executives with the highest pay in the annual report. However, the 
compensation structure was not specified in details. Only one bank disclosed the individual 
compensation of the top management and directors. Finally, fees paid to external auditors, 
advisors and other related parties were disclosed by only around 50% of the banks. 
Summary on the Effectiveness of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The survey results show that Thai banks have introduced various control mechanisms and 
met the minimum requirements of the supervisory agencies. However, corporate governance 
practices of Thai banks seem less effective than the international standards.  
Regarding the board of directors, management and committees, banks reported full 
compliance with the regulations. Furthermore, the opinion survey reveals that in general the 
board appeared to be effective. That being said, the following two issues were reported as 
potential weaknesses. First, the board’s role in nominating and evaluating the CEO 
performance was rather restricted. Second, directors received limited financial support from   32
banks to obtain outside training and services. Third, stock-based compensation was not used 
in all banks. Directors and top executives held almost no shares in the banks. Nevertheless, 
our survey shows that CEO compensation was to some extent related to the bank’s 
performance. Banks appear to have specific performance objectives. All the five banks that 
responded to our survey indicated that CEO compensation was clearly linked with 
performance measures. 
To enhance the effectiveness of the board of directors, the survey reviews that banks should 
do the following. First, banks should select better qualified and truly independent directors. 
Second, they should also promote a boardroom culture that encourages constructive criticism 
and alternative views. Third, banks should also provide adequate and timely information to 
directors. Fourth, they should allow board evaluation of CEO performance. In addition, 
director compensation should be better linked with performance. Lastly, the board should not 
be dominated by the controlling shareholder. 
Regarding internal control, the board of directors and the audit committee were responsible to 
supervise the internal control system. In addition, the risk management committee was also 
set up to oversee risk management procedures. Each bank surveyed also had a system to 
maintain the risk exposure within certain limits. While credit and market risk management 
practices were quite developed, operational risk management practices seemed to be lower 
than the international standards.  
Regarding public information disclosure, Thai banks have not yet adequately disclosed their 
major information relative to international standards. Therefore, besides financial statements, 
other important information namely executive compensation structure, risk exposure, and 
corporate governance practices should be disclosed in greater details.  
In the quest to improve corporate governance of banks in Thailand, the survey shows that 
financial supervisory agencies, outside/independent directors, and large shareholders featured 
as the most important entities.  
5. Discipline by Market Participants 
Market discipline refers to market-based mechanisms that provide a disincentive to banks to 
engage in moral hazard behavior. In principle, the various economic agents that can exercise 
market discipline are namely depositors, bondholders, stockholders, and credit rating 
agencies. The effectiveness of market discipline in monitoring banks depends on the 
following factors: (1) the extent of the government safety net, (2) the degree to which the 
bank is financed by uninsured liabilities, (3) the degree of competition among banks and the 
development of the banking sector, and (4) the extent of the ability to observe bank risk 
choice. In this section, we discuss the institutional background of the banking industry and 
evaluate the effectiveness of market discipline in the Thai banking sector.   33
Background of the Banking Industry 
Competition in the product markets is considered to be a powerful force towards 
improvement in corporate governance. The banking services market should be no exception. 
This section presents the characteristics of Thai banks regarding bank concentration, 
profitability, and efficiency. We also investigate the financing structure. The financial data 
are obtained from the I-SIMS and SETSMART databases produced by the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand.   
Bank Concentration and Competition Structure 
First, we examine the market shares classified by bank size based on total assets: large, 
medium, and small. The ranking has remained the same for the period 1990-2003. Note that 
the ranking is similar when total deposits are used. Bangkok Bank, KasikornBank, and Krung 
Thai Bank have been the top three largest banks. Siam Commercial Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, 
and Thai Military Bank have been the medium size banks. Figure 5:1 indicates that the 
banking industry has been very concentrated. The top three banks hold about 50% of the total 
assets and deposits of the banking industry. Bank concentration is even higher in the post 
crisis period. The fraction of assets held by the top three banks is 49.8% in 1996, and 52.9% 
and 54% in 2001 and 2003, respectively. The fraction of deposits held by the top three banks 
is 50.5%, 54.2%, and 54.8%, respectively. The top four to six banks hold only about one-
fourth of the total assets and deposits of the banking industry. Combined, the largest six 
banks hold slightly more than 80% of the total assets and deposits in the post crisis period. 
Next, we show market concentration classified by ownership. A bank is classified as being 
controlled by the following types of shareholders based on whether the largest shareholder 
owns at least 25% of the outstanding shares: government, family, and foreign investor.
13 Here, 
the government includes the following government agencies: BOT, MOF, FIDF, and the Thai 
Army and Air Forces (who were the controlling shareholder of Thai Military Bank until 
2002). The “other banks” category includes banks in which the largest shareholder owns less 
than 25% of the shares. In this sense, the ownership is “widely held”. We categorize the Siam 
Commercial Bank in this category because its largest shareholder, the Crown Property 
Bureau, is subjected to the special banking law (see Section 2.1). Since 2001, however, the 
Crown Property Bureau holds less than 25% of the shares.   
Table 5:1 shows that the ownership structure of the banking sector changed tremendously 
after the crisis. Before the crisis, the ownership of Thai banks was concentrated within a 
handful of families. Out of fifteen banks, twelve banks were family owned, two banks were 
government owned and one bank was owned by the Crown Property Bureau. There was no 
single widely held bank. The family owned banks account for about 61.9% of total assets of 
the banking industry.  
                                                            
13 According to the Thai corporate law, a shareholder can vote against any important corporate decisions if he   34
However, after the crisis, the number of government owned banks and widely held banks 
increased dramatically, while family owned banks almost disappeared. Due to consolidations 
of distressed banks, the percentage of bank assets held by the government increases sharply 
to 42.9% in 2001, but declined to 33.3% in 2003 after some banks were sold to foreign 
interests. The asset shares of widely held banks increase abruptly. In 2003, five out of thirteen 
banks were widely held. These banks held about 49.6% of total assets of the banking industry. 
Foreign banks, however, are relatively small. The three foreign owned banks accounted for 
about 7.3% of total assets of the banking industry in 2003.   
Profitability and Efficiency  
We measure bank profitability by the ratio of before tax profits to total assets (ROA). As a 
measure of bank efficiency, we consider the accounting value of a bank’s net interest income 
over total assets (net interest margin). To account for management quality, we include the 
ratio of overhead costs to total assets. This variable captures cross-bank different business 
systems, product mixes, and asset allocations with consequently different cost structures. So, 
overhead may capture cost inefficiency. We also measure the importance of fee-based 
services for banks by the ratio of non-interest operating income to total assets.  
Table 5:2 shows the statistics breaking down the banks by ownership. We find that widely 
held banks tend to perform better than government and foreign banks. Specifically, widely 
held banks have relatively higher ROA, high net interest margins, and smaller overheads, and 
high non-interest income. For example, in 2003 the average ROA in the five widely held 
banks is 1.2% while the average ROAs in government banks and foreign banks are -1.5% and 
-0.1%, respectively.  
Table 5:3 shows that the capital ratio as measured by the BIS ratio. It was not until 2001 that 
all banks have met the BIS capital adequacy ratio of 8.5%. Consistent with the results on the 
ROA, in 2003, widely held banks had the highest BIS ratio at 15.4%, while the average BIS 
ratios of government banks and foreign banks are 14.1%, and 12.6%, respectively.   
Table 5:4 reviews asset quality measured by the ratio of NPLs to total loans. Government 
owned banks have the lowest NPLs because a large proportion of their NPLs have been 
transferred to the TAMC. The average ratio of NPLs to total assets at the government owned 
banks is 5.9%, 8.0%, and 5.7% in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. In foreign owned 
banks, the NPL ratio is higher than that of government banks, respectively but is lower than 
that of other banks. This is because a large fraction of them have been removed from the 
books before the banks were sold to foreign investors. At widely held banks, the average ratio 
of NPLs to total loans is 15.4%, 18.2%, and 14.2%, in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
owns at least 25% of the outstanding shares. So, with at least 25% of the outstanding shares because in which 
case there would be no other shareholder who could have enough voting rights of 75% to vote against him.    35
Liabilities and Equity 
Table 5:5 shows that Thai banks rely to a considerable extent on deposits to fund their assets. 
The mean ratio of deposits to total assets for all banks is 82%, 81.5%, and 81% in 2001, 
2002, and 2003, respectively. Foreign banks have lower deposits than other banks. For 
example, in 2003 the average share of assets funded with deposits in foreign banks is 79.5%. 
In other banks, however, the mean assets funded with deposits in large banks are greater than 
80%.  
“Non-deposit liabilities” are by far less important sources of funding. Foreign owned banks 
rely more substantially on the interbank market relative to other banks. While the shares of 
assets funded with the interbank for the four foreign banks are about 7-8% in 2001-2003, the 
ratios of interbank to total assets for other banks are less than 4%.  
Banks rely less and less on borrowing which includes subordinated notes, bonds, and 
convertible bonds, convertible bonds, floating rate notes, and subordinated bonds cum 
preferred shares. The mean ratio of total borrowing to total assets for all banks is 9.8%, 3.8%, 
and 3.6% in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Thai banks have relatively low equity ratio 
after the crisis. The mean equity ratio for all banks declined significantly from 8.2% in 1996 
to 3.8% in 2000. Since 2000, however, the equity ratio has been increasing over time (except 
for Bank of Asia and DBS Thai Danu Bank). Relatively, widely held banks have higher 
equity ratio of 9.1% in 2003 which is higher than the mean equity ratio for all banks of 7.2%.  
********************************************************************* 
Insert Figure 5:1, Table 5:1, Table 5:2, Table 5:3, Table 5:4, Table 5:5 here 
********************************************************************** 
The Strength of Market Discipline 
Market discipline is likely to be more effective, the lesser the degree of explicit or implicit 
government guarantees relating to bank liabilities, the deeper and better functioning markets 
where price and quantity movement convey useful information about the solvency of banks, 
and the greater the degree of bank disclosure. We investigate the effectiveness of market 
discipline based on this framework.  
We argue that market discipline is less effective in Thailand due to the institutional setting. 
As argued earlier, until the crisis, Thai banks have been protected by an implicit government 
guarantee that no bank would be allowed to fail. Market discipline is undermined by this 
policy as bank stakeholders expect that the government will bail out distressed banks. Market 
sensitivity is dampened by a blanket guarantee that is applied to all depositors and creditors 
since 1997. Since the coverage is unlimited, this full protection reduces incentives for   36
depositors and creditors to discipline banks. In addition, as shown above, the banking sector 
is very concentrated in the top three largest banks.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, the ownership of Thai banks is very concentrated. We find 
that there are eight banks in 2001 and seven banks in 2002 and 2003 in which the largest 
shareholder holds more than 50% of the shares. Concentrated ownership may contaminate 
market discipline exercised by other shareholders and other stakeholders since it would be 
difficult to vote against the controlling shareholders. In this section, we show some evidence 
to support our argument that monitoring by major stakeholders namely depositors and 
shareholders are ineffective.  
Discipline by Depositors 
Theoretically, depositors have an incentive to monitor banks and suppress excessive risk-
taking activities since they maintain deposit accounts and depend on banks for settlement 
transactions. Consequently, they would suffer losses should the banks fail. Both large and 
small depositors can discipline banks by shifting deposits from risky banks to safer banks. 
Depositors can also demand higher interest rates from risky banks to compensate the risk. 
Here, we test whether depositors are sensitive to bank risk and select banks based on risk 
exposure. If this is the case, deposit growth should be negatively related to bank risk.  
We use the BIS ratio as a measure of risk. The banks are classified into two groups: high risk 
and low risk banks. The cut-off is based on the median value of the BIS in 1997 which is 
9.13%. So, here only 13 banks that operated as of the end of 1997 are included in our sample. 
Banks are classified as “high risk banks” if the BIS ratio is below the median value. 
Otherwise, they are classified as “low risk banks.” High risk banks are the following seven 
banks: Krungthai Bank, Siam City Bank, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, Thai Military Bank, 
(Standard Chartered) Nakornthon Bank, Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO), and Bank of Ayudhya.  
Figure 5:2 plots the deposit growth rate for high risk and low risk banks. Except the crisis 
period (1997-1998), the growth rate of deposits is quite similar for two groups of banks. This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that depositors do not discipline banks when they 
were fully protected. Depositors were extremely sensitive to bank risk only during the crisis 
in 1997 when they seemed to be panic. Both groups of banks experienced a sharp drop of 
deposits due to bank runs. Consistent with the literature, deposits at high risk banks, however, 
declined more than those at low risk banks. However, once the blanket guarantee was 
implemented, deposits at both groups of banks increased significantly in 1998. The deposits 
at high risk banks increased more than low risk banks. Apparently, out of the 7 high risk 
banks, 4 were owned by government agencies or nationalized in 1998. With the blanket 
guarantee and in addition to the fact that the banks were government owned, depositors at 
these high risk banks might not be sensitive to risk.    37
To confirm this finding, we perform a regression analysis relating the growth rate of deposits 
to the BIS ratio. The advantage of this methodology is that the results are not subjected to the 
choices of the cut-off of the BIS ratio. Also, we control the effects of bank size, profitability, 
and ownership. Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Bank size captures the 
government’s too-big-too-fail policy. Profitability is measured by the ratio of earning before 
tax to total assets. Profitability is an inverse measure of risk exposure. We include a dummy 
variable, state-owned bank to capture government owned banks that are least likely to fail. 
The dummy variable takes the value of one if the largest shareholder is the government, and 
zero otherwise. To account for the business cycle effect, we include year dummies.  
Table 5:6 presents the pooled OLS regression results. The sample includes all banks that were 
operating during 1996-2003. Overall, the results are consistent with Figure 5:2. The estimated 
coefficients on the BIS ratio are positive but not significant at the conventional levels. The 
results indicate that depositors do not respond to risk exposures measured by the BIS ratio. 
We also find that the deposit growth rate is significantly higher at government owned banks 
than other banks. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on bank size is not significant. This 
evidence implies that depositors recognize that they were fully protected by a blanket 
guarantee regardless of bank size.  
In unreported results, we ran regressions to check the robustness of our results. First, to 
control for the ownership structure effect, we included two ownership dummy variables 
indicating whether banks were owned by family and foreign investors. Second, we tried 
another two alternative measures of bank risk namely the NPL ratio and the ratio of earnings 
before tax to total assets. Third, to account for the possibility that depositors might not 
immediately react to risk factors, we also used one period lagged the BIS ratio, the NPL, ratio 
and the ratio of earnings before tax to total assets. Our results remained unchanged. 
Next, we investigate whether depositors discipline banks by demanding higher interest rates 
from unhealthy banks. Figure 5:3 plots the median value of the deposit interest rates paid by 
low risk and high risk banks. The interest rate spread has been very small, except during the 
crisis period in which the spread rose significantly. This result indicates that depositors were 
sensitive to bank risk only when they were not confident about a bank’s future.  
Discipline by Shareholders 
The ability to monitor and discipline banks depends crucially on the existence of deep and 
well functioning markets where price and quantity movements convey information about the 
solvency of banks. Table 5:7 shows that the turnover ratio of bank stocks is lower than other 
stocks in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in all periods except 1998. For example, the 
turnover ratio of bank stocks is 90.1%, 62.6%, and 123.2% in 2001, 2002, and 2003, 
respectively. The turnover ratio of other stocks is 171.2%, 200.3%, and 281.2% during the 
same period. The trading of bank stocks is also thinner compared to that of high income 
OECD countries where the turnover ratio is 139.4% in 2001 (Levy-Yeyati, Peria, and   38
Schmukler, 2004). Accordingly, price and quantity movements may not be very sensitive to 
the underlying fundamentals, and undermining their potential as a market discipline. 
We test this issue by analyzing whether bank’s stock returns are sensitive to its fundamentals. 
Bank’s fundamentals are measured by three proxies for risk exposure and profitability 
namely the NPL ratio, the BIS ratio, and the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets. We expect 
that the stock market should respond positively to a lower NPL ratio, a higher BIS ratio and 
profitability. Table 5:8 shows the correlation between stock returns and the three variables. 
The sample includes all banks from 1990 until 2003 or until the year when the banks were 
closed down.
 14 In general, the stock market did not effectively respond to the information on 
risk exposures and profitability. The signs of the correlation between stock returns are not 
always as expected. Also, the correlation coefficients are not large. But, among the three 
variables, the results show that the stock market responds best to the BIS ratio.  
Disciplining by Uninsured Funding 
The literature suggests that the effect of market discipline is likely to be stronger, the larger 
the amount of uninsured funding. Sophisticated investors that hold uninsured subordinated 
liabilities are likely to have incentives to monitor the banks because their claims are junior to 
protected liabilities such as bank deposits. Also, if banks have to go to the market to issue 
debt, the process requires them to reveal information about the banks to debt holders and to 
supervisors. Since the blanket guarantee on creditors was abandoned in October 2003, we 
expect that creditors should have more incentive to monitor banks.  
As shown in Table 5:5, the mean ratio of total borrowing to total assets of all banks is 9.8%, 
and 3.6% in 2001 and 2003, respectively. The borrowing has been decreasing over time. 
Among the banks, the ratio of total borrowing to total assets is highest in widely held banks 
(about 5.4% in 2003) and lowest in government owned banks. While in 2003, a government 
owned Siam City Bank has no outstanding borrowing, Krung Thai Bank has a very small 
portion of borrowing. This evidence suggests that the potential for market discipline by debt 
holders may be greater for widely held banks. 
Credit rating agencies may enhance market discipline. As major rating agencies gain access 
to information on banks that is not publicly available to investors and they act as 
intermediaries in the disclosure process, investors would have more information about rated 
banks. We find that out of 13 banks in 2003, seven banks issued subordinated debt and were 
rated by Moody’s.  
                                                            
14 We could not include UOB Radanasin Bank because the data on stock returns are not available, and 
Thanachart Bank because it was established in 2001.   39
******************************************************* 
Insert Table 5:6, Table 5:7, Table 5:8, Figure 5:2, Figure 5:3 here 
******************************************************* 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The East Asian financial crisis has greatly affected the Thai banking sector. The 15 domestic 
banks operating before the crisis experienced severe problems of impaired assets at different 
degrees. The worst cases were the eight banks in which the government intervened: one was 
closed down, five were nationalized and integrated with other government owned banks, and 
two were acquired by foreign banks. As for the remaining seven banks, three banks were 
acquired by foreign banks while the other four banks were recapitalized and underwent 
massive restructurings.  
The crisis also enormously changed the ownership and control structure of Thai banks. Until 
the crisis, fourteen out of fifteen banks were owned by families that had control over the 
banks during the past decades. After the crisis, the ownership became much less concentrated 
and widespread amongst other types of shareholders. Among thirteen domestic banks in 2003, 
three banks were controlled by the government, three by foreign banks, only one by a family, 
and the remaining five banks were widely held. The three government-owned banks were 
relatively large and accounted for about 33% of total assets of the banking sector, while the 
five widely held banks accounted for around 50% of total assets.  
In order to deal with the banking problems and establish a stable financial system, the 
authorities have implemented a number of measures, including legal reforms and establishing 
several institutions. Among the immediate measures was the implementation of a formal 
blanket guarantee in 1997 in order to prevent bank runs. The authorities have also attempted 
to strengthen prudential regulations. One of the major government undertakings is to 
introduce the Financial Institutions Business Act that combines the three current acts 
governing different types of financial institutions. The new Act will encourage financial 
institutions to become more self-regulated and pave the way for universal banking in 
Thailand. Moreover, under the new Act, the BOT will have the exclusive supervisory power 
over all types of financial institutions, rather than sharing the power with the Ministry of 
Finance.  
The financial authorities have introduced numerous measures to strengthen prudential 
supervision and examination, and to enhance the effectiveness of internal governance 
mechanisms of banks. To improve bank supervision, the BOT has altered the supervisory 
policy framework to a risk-based supervision. The BOT restructured its organization and set 
up the Examiner School. Furthermore, the BOT requires that a bank have a “risk management 
committee” to oversee the overall risks of the bank. Regarding the efforts to promote   40
corporate governance effectiveness, the focuses are on the composition and characteristics of 
the board of directors, the fit and proper criteria for management, and the establishment of 
audit, risk management and other committees to strengthen the internal controls.  
To evaluate the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms of Thai banks, we 
have launched the questionnaire survey to all domestic commercial banks. There are four sets 
of the questionnaires including the effectiveness of the board of directors, the executive 
compensation scheme, the risk management practices, the internal control system, and the 
disclosure policy. The response rate to the survey is over 90%. Overall, the survey results 
show that Thai banks have typically fulfilled the basic requirements by the supervisory 
agencies. But, they have not yet met the international standard.  
To bring the corporate governance standards of Thai banks up to international standards, the 
following measures should be taken into account. First, there should be more independent 
directors in the board. Also, the BOT should ensure that independent directors are well 
qualified and truly independent of the bank’s controlling or major shareholders. Second, the 
BOT should demand that banks provide directors with adequate and timely information, as 
well as sufficient access to professional services and training at the expense of the banks. 
Third, the CEO nomination and removal process as well as the evaluation process of CEO 
performance should be formally supervised by the board of directors and/or the nomination 
and compensation committees. Fourth, the BOT should encourage banks to evaluate 
director’s performance on an individual basis instead of an aggregate basis commonly used 
by Thai banks. Compensation to CEO and directors may also be made more stock-based. 
Finally, the supervisory agencies should require more detailed information disclosure on the 
executive compensation, risk exposure, the extent to which the bank’s corporate governance 
practices conform to the established standards, and transactions with related parties.  
We find that market discipline appears to be ineffective in Thailand. The banking industry 
has de facto been operating under an implicit guarantee that no bank would be allowed to fail. 
In addition, the blanket guarantee that was implanted in 1998 offers full protection to all 
depositors and to creditors. The cover to creditors, however, was removed in October 2003. 
This institutional setting undermines market disciplines by all stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
current concentrated structure of the banking services market might weaken the discipline 
function by the market. We actually find that depositors are not sensitive to bank risk. They 
did not appear to move away from risky banks and did not demand higher interest rates 
except for the crisis period when they were not certain about the safety of their deposits. The 
stock market, however, is somewhat sensitive to risk exposure.  
Our findings suggest that it is important to design a mechanism that prevents moral hazard in 
the banking industry. The level of deposit and credit protection should be set in such a way 
that it encourages both investors to select banks based on risk exposure and monitor them. 
The government should also be aware of restrictions on new entries into the banking sector as 
it undermines monitoring function provided by competition from rival banks.   41
The 1997 East Asian crisis has brought about the weaknesses in corporate governance in both 
financial and corporate sectors, which in turn aggravated the severity of the crisis. 
Understanding corporate governance of banks and the financial environment may help 
prevent the occurrence of another economic crisis, or at least minimize adverse impacts of the 
crisis to the economy.  
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Table 1:1 
Thai Financial System during 1996-2003 
 
This table presents the component of the Thai financial system for the period 1996-2003. All variables are presented in billion baht. Percentage columns show 
the variables as percentages of GDP. The data are obtained from the Bank of Thailand and the Stock Exchange of Thailand.   
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
  Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Commercial banks                  
  Assets  5,536  120.0  7,391  156.2  6,465  139.7  6,172  133.1  6,254 127.0  6,410 124.9 6,466  118.6 6,821  114.9 
    Domestic banks  n.a.  n.a.  5,690  120.2  5,571  120.4  5,408 116.6  5,478 111.3  5,665 110.4 5,780  106.0 6,122  103.1 
        Foreign  banks  n.a.  n.a.  1,432 30.3 894 19.3 764 16.5 767 15.6 745 14.5 686  12.58 699  11.77 
  Credits  4,478  97.1  5,967  126.1  5,318  115.0  4,952  106.8  4,114 83.6  3,899 76.0  4,570 83.8  4,749 80.0 
    Domestic banks  n.a.  n.a.  4,924  104.0  4,622  99.9  4,405 95.0  3,603 73.2  3,419 66.6  4,121 75.6  4,334 73.0 
        Foreign  banks  n.a.  n.a.  1,043 22.0 695 15.0 547 11.8 511 10.4 480  9.4 449  8.2 415  7.0 
  Deposits  3,876  84.0  4,268  90.2  4,580  99.0  4,608 99.4  4,864 98.8  5,059 98.5  5,187 95.1  5,395 90.8 
    Domestic banks  n.a.  n.a.  4,083  86.3  4,395  95.0  4,392 94.7  4,630 94.0  4,799 93.5  4,913 90.1  5,114 86.1 
    Foreign banks  n.a.  n.a.  184  3.9  186  4.0  216 4.7  234 4.8  260 5.1  274 5.0  281 4.7 
  No. of institutions  29    35    37    34    34    31    31    31   
    Domestic banks  15    15    16    13    13    13    13    13   
        Foreign  banks  14   20   21   21   21   18   18   18  
Finance companies                          
    Assets  1,768 38.3 616 13.0 502 10.9 245  5.3 253  5.1 280  5.5 254  4.7 310  5.2 
    Credits  1,368 29.7 491 10.4 400  8.7 148  3.2 133  2.7 153  3.0 147  2.7 196  3.3 
  Borrowings and deposits  1,440  31.2  504  10.7  437  9.5  178  3.8  182  3.7  204  4.0  179  3.3  217  3.7 
  No. of institutions  91    35    36    22    21    21    19    18   
Credit Foncier companies                        
    Assets  9 0.2  7 0.2  7 0.2  5 0.1  5 0.1  6 0.1  6 0.1  2 0.0 
    Credits  7 0.2  6 0.1  5 0.1  4 0.1  3 0.1  4 0.1  5 0.1  1 0.0 
    Borrowings  7 0.2  6 0.1  5 0.1  4 0.1  4 0.1  4 0.1  5 0.1  2 0.0 
  No. of institutions  12    12    12    10    10    9    6    5   
                          
SET Market 
capitalization  2,560 55.5  1,133 23.9  1,268 27.4  2,193 47.3  1,279 26.0  1,578 31.3  2,047 36.4  4,670 80.7   45
Table 2:1  
The 14 August 1998 Program 
 
This table presents the timetables of implementing the 14 August 1998 measures, regarding the 
resolution of six banks intervened by the government.  
 
Measures Date 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) and Siam City Bank (SCIB) – privatized 
-  After full provisioning, capitalization up to 8.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
-  Selection of financial advisors for privatization. 
-  Announcement of divestiture modalities for the privatization process. 
-  Acceptance of bids and transfer to new investors. 
 
31 August 1998 
15 September 1998 
20 September 1998 
31 December 1998 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) – transformed into non-bank financial institution 
(AMC) and wound down 
-  BBC’s banking license to be restricted from accepting new depositors, 
extending new credit, entering new foreign exchange operations, and 
assuming contingent liabilities. 
-  The Ministry of Finance (MOF)/The Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the 
modalities for Krung Thai Bank (KTB)’s absorption of performing assets, 
deposits, and other liabilities. 
-  Terminate management contract with the Industrial Finance Corporation of 
Thailand in line with existing collateral arrangements. 
-  Transfer of performing assets, deposits and other liabilities to KTB. 
-  Banking license revoked and BBC turned into a private AMC. 
-  Adoption of plan for effective closure of BBC by 31 December 1999, 
including with regard to the rationalization of staff and branches, and the 





17 August 1998 
 
 
17 August 1998 
 
31 August 1998 
30 September 1998 
31 October 1998 
 
 
31 October 1998 
First Bangkok City Bank (FBCB) – integrated with KTB 
-  KTB management to take charge of all FBCB operations. 
-  After full provisioning, recapitalization up to 8.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
-  MOF/BOT to announce modalities for the integration with KTB. 
-  FBCB to be fully integrated with KTB and revocation of license. 
 
17 August 1998 
30 September 1998 
30 September 1998 
31 December 1998 
Union Bank of Bangkok (UB) – integrated with Krung Thai Thanakit Finance (KTT) 
-  After full provisioning, recapitalization up to 8.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
-  Adopt plan for completing UB’s integration with KTT by 31 December 
1998. 
 
31 August 1998 
 
31 October 1998 
Laem Thong Bank (LTB) – integrated with Radanasin Bank (RSB) 
-  After full provisioning, recapitalization up to 8.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
-  Adopt plan for completing LTB’s integration with RSB by 31 December 
1998. 
-  After full provisioning, recapitalization upon the BOT’s approval of 
operational plan. 
 
31 August 1998 
 
31 October 1998 
 
15 November 1998 
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Table 2:2  
Identity of Largest Shareholder of Thai Domestic Commercial Banks: 1996-2003 
 
This table presents the name of the largest shareholders of all Thai commercial banks in 1996, 2000, and 2003. The information on the largest 
shareholder in 1996 and 2000 is obtained from Anuchitworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2003). 
 
Largest Shareholder   Commercial Banks 
(End of 1996) 
Commercial Banks  
(End of 2003) 
1996 2000 2003 
 
Resolution during the Crisis 
Bank of Ayudhya  Bank of Ayudhya  Ratanarak   Ratanarak   Ratanarak  Recapitalized 
Bangkok Bank  Bangkok Bank  Sophonpanich   Sophonpanich   HSBC Banks  Recapitalized 





State Street Bank 
and Trust 












Recapitalized through security and bond 
markets 






Recapitalized through security and bond 
markets 
Nakornthon Bank  Standard Chartered 
Nakornthon Bank  Wang Lee   Standard 
Chartered Bank  
Standard 
Chartered Bank 
Nationalized in 1999,  recapitalized and 
then sold to Standard Chartered Bank in 
1999 
Bank of Asia  Bank of Asia  Phatraprasith   ABN-AMRO Bank 
of the Netherlands  ABN-AMRO Bank  Acquired by ABN-AMRO Bank in 1998 





Bank of Singapore 
Development 
Bank of Singapore 
Acquired by Development Bank of 
Singapore in 1998 
Laem Thong Bank  UOB Radanasin 
Bank  Chansrichawala   -  -  Nationalized and integrated with Radanasin 
Bank in 1998 
-  UOB Radanasin 




Newly established (assets from Laem 
Thong Bank) in 1997   48 
Table 2:2  
Identity of Largest Shareholder of Thai Domestic Commercial Banks: 1996-2003 (continued) 
 
Largest Shareholder  Commercial Banks 
(End of 1996) 
Commercial Banks  
(End of 2003)  1996 2000 2003 
 
Resolution during the Crisis 
Krungthai Bank  Krungthai Bank  State  State  State 
Recapitalized by capital injection by the 
State (201.57 billion baht in 1998 and 
2000) and debt-equity conversion by 
receiving good loans, deposits and liabilities 
of BBC and FBCB. 
Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce  Krungthai Bank  Tantipipatpong   -  - 
Nationalized in 1996 and closed down in 
1998. The performing assets and liabilities 
were transferred to Krung Thai Bank 
First Bangkok City 
Bank  Krungthai Bank  Siriwattanapakdee  -  - 
The government intervened and 
recapitalized in 1998, then nationalized and 
integrated with Krung Thai Bank  
Siam City Bank  Siam City Bank  Srifuengfung and 
Mahadamrongkul   State   State   Nationalized in 1998, and recapitalized. 
Bangkok 




State   - 
Intervened in 1997 and nationalized in 
1998, then integrated with Siam City Bank 
in 2002 




Cholvijarn   -  -  Nationalized and integrated with Krung 
Thai Thanakit Finance in 1998 
- Bank  Thai  -  State  State 
Newly established in 1998. The assets were 
from the Union Bank of Bangkok, Krung 
Thai Thanakit Finance, and 12 closed down 
finance companies. 
- Thanachart  Bank  -  -  Morgan Stanley & 
Co 
New license granted to Ekachart Finance in 
2001  
Table 2:3 
Thai Domestic Commercial Banks Classified by Types of the Largest Shareholder 
 
This table presents the number of banks according to the type of their largest shareholder, as well as 
the percentage to total number of banks for each type of largest shareholder. 
 
Number of Banks  Type of Largest 
Shareholder  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Family  12  10 5 2 2 1 1 1 
Crown Property Bureau  1  2  1  1  1  1  1  1 
State  2  3 5 4 5 5 4 4 
Foreign  investor  0  0 1 5 5 6 7 7 




Table 2:4  
Voting Rights and Cash-Flow Rights Held by the Largest Shareholder  
of Thai Commercial Banks  
 
The table presents the percentage of voting rights (VR) and cash-flow rights (CR) held by the 
largest shareholder classified by types of largest shareholders for the period 1996-2003. The data of 
1996-2000 is obtained from Anuchitworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2003). 
 
Type of Largest 
Shareholder 
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 
VR  23.2  25.7  29.8  29.7  14.9 27.7 33.5 26.6  Family 
CR  18.7  21.9  23.8  22.3  10.7 20.0 24.8 18.7 
VR  34.6  22.5  34.9  34.9  25.1 20.8 14.8 12.2  Crown 
Property 
Bureau  CR  31.6  17.9  29.5  29.7  23.4 20.8 14.8 12.2 
VR  47.8  55.0  82.8  84.4  86.7 78.0 70.2 65.0  State 
CR  47.4  54.1  82.8  84.4  86.7 78.0 69.1 64.0 
VR  0.0  0.0  9.4  57.8  57.3 49.0 42.7 43.5  Foreign investor 
CR  0.0  0.0  9.4  57.8  57.3 49.0 42.6 43.5 
VR  27.3  31.1  50.6  60.1  59.6 56.4 48.3 46.4  Average 
CR  23.3  27.8  47.7  58.4  58.8 55.8 47.3 45.5 
 Table 3:1  
Resignations and Dismissals of the Governors of the Bank of Thailand during 1942-2000 
The information is complied from Satitniramai (2002) and the website of the Bank of Thailand at http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/ 




Dismissed Reasons/Causes  Duration  of  Office 
H.H.Prince  Vivadhanajaya  Resigned  Protested the government’s method of selling gold reserves  Nov. 1942-Oct. 1946 
Serm Winitchaikul  Resigned  Personal reasons  Oct. 1946-Nov. 1947 
Leng Srisomwongse  Resigned  Personal reasons  Nov. 1947-Sept. 1948 
M.C. Chaiyand Wiwatthanachai  Resigned  Personal reasons  Sept.–Dec. 1948 
Leng Srisomwongse  Resigned  Personal reasons  Dec. 1948-Aug. 1949 
M.L. Dej  Snitwongse   Resigned  Protested the government’s plan to revalue the Baht  Aug. 1949-Feb 1952 
Serm Winitchaikul  Resigned  Personal reasons  Mar. 1952-July 1955 
Kasem Sriphayak  Resigned  Took responsibility for a crime of fraud committed by a BOT staff  July 1955-July 1958 
Chote Kunakasem   Dismissed  Allegation of corrupt conduct when changing banknote printing 
company 
July 1958-May 1959 
Puey Ungphakorn  Resigned  Personal reasons  June 1959-Aug. 1971 
Bhisudhidhi 
Nimmanhaemindahaemin  
Resigned  Allegation of corrupt conduct regarding the construction contract of 
the BOT new Headquarters  
Aug. 1971-May 1975 
Snoh Unakul  Resigned  Bad health  May 1975-Nov. 1979 
Nukul Prachuabmoh 
 
Dismissed  Disagreement with the Finance Minister over the currency devaluation 
on Sept. 13, 1984  
Nov. 1979-Sept 1984 
Kamchorn Sathirakul  
 
Dismissed  Disagreement with the Finance Minister over the interest rate 
reduction policy 
Sept. 1984-Mar1990 
Chavalit Thanachanan  Resigned  Reached the BOT’s official retirement age  Mar.-Sept. 1990 




Mismanagement that led to the collapse of the Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce  
Oct. 1990-July 1996 
Rerngchai Marakanond Pressured  to 
resign 
Mismanagement of the foreign exchange regime that led to the 
economic crisis 
July 1996-July 1997 
Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi Pressured  to 
resign 
As above  July 1997-May 1998 
M.R. Chatu Mongol Sonakul  Dismissed  Disagreement with the Prime Minister on the interest rate policy  May 1998-May 2001 Table 4:1  
Board of directors: Characteristics 
 
This table presents the characteristics of banks’ board of directors during 2001-2003. Education of 
board members is a dummy variable taking value of 0 if a director holds a certificate lower than 
Bachelor Degree, 1 if holds Bachelor Degree, 2 if holds Master Degree, and 3 if holds Doctoral 
Degree. Finance/Banking background of board members is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a 
director has some background in the finance or banking area, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Board  characteristics  2001 2002 2003
Number of banks surveyed  13  13  13
Number of board members  10.9  11.5  11.9
Number of executive directors  3.7  3.7  3.9
Number of non-executive directors  3.6  3.9  4.1
Number of independent directors  3.5  4.0  3.9
% of banks that have founding family directors  23.1  23.1  23.1
% of founding family directors on board  4.8  4.7  4.5
% of banks that have a founding family member as Chairperson/CEO  23.1  23.1  23.1
% of banks that have foreign directors                                46.2 46.2 46.2
% of foreign directors on board  16.3  18.9  19.3
% of banks that have a foreigner as Chairperson/CEO   15.4  23.1  23.1
% of banks that have a foreigner as an executive director  30.9  30.8  23.1
% of banks that have a foreigner as a non-executive director  30.8  30.8  38.4
% of banks that have a foreigner as an  independent  director  38.5 30.8 30.8
Age of board members  56.6  57.7  57.8
Education of board members  1.7  1.7  2.2
Finance/Banking background of board members  0.8  0.8  0.8
Number of other listed companies that a bank’s directors sit on board  0.5  0.6  0.6
Number of unlisted companies that a bank’s directors sit on board  1.1  1.2  1.7
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Table 4:2  
Chairperson and CEO: Characteristics 
 
This table presents the characteristics of banks’ Chairperson and CEO as of 2003. The figures the 
“Chairperson” and “CEO” columns show the number of banks in which the Chairperson and the 
CEO possess the specified characteristics, respectively. The total number of banks operating in 
2003 is 13.  
  
Characteristics  The Chairperson  The CEO 
Family member of controlling shareholder  1  1 
Former officer of the Bank of Thailand, Ministry of Finance, 
or other financial supervisory agency 
1 1 
Former elected or non-elected politician  2  0 
Having a final BA degree  6  4 
Having a final MA degree  5  8 
Having a Ph. D degree  1  1 
Having background in finance or economics  10  12 
Having background in accounting  0  0 
Having background in law  0  1 
Female 0  4 




Board of Directors: Independent versus Other Directors 
 
This table presents the characteristics of banks’ board of directors classified into independent and 
other directors as of 2003. Other directors include all non-independent directors. Figures in “Share 
of Directors” columns are the average percentage of directors who possess the specified 
characteristics in a bank’s board. Figures in “No. of Banks” columns are the number of banks 
where a director with the specified characteristic sits in the board. The total number of banks 
operating in 2003 is 13. “Former elected or non-elected politicians” include cabinet members. 
 
Independent Directors Other Directors 










Family members of controlling shareholder  n.a.  n.a.  8.0  3 
Officers of the Bank of Thailand  0.0  0  8.1  6 
Former officers of the Bank of Thailand  17.9  3  1.9  2 
Officers of the Ministry of Finance  0.0  0  6.6  4 
Former officers of the Ministry of Finance  2.6  1  3.3  3 
Officers of other financial supervisory agency  0.0  0  0.0  0 
Former officers of other financial supervisory 
agency  0.0 0  0.0 0 
Officers of other government agencies  14.1  4  10.3  4 
Former officers of other government agencies  10.1  5  6.1  6 
Former elected or non-elected politicians  3.5  2  4.0  3 
Bank employees  n.a.  n.a.  26.4  12 
Employees of the bank’s affiliated companies  0.0  0  10.2  6 
Employees of other financial institutions  6.0 3  26.3 6 
University professors or researchers  7.3  3  2.4  2 
Members with a final BA degree  34.6  11  39.7  13 
Members with a final MA degree  34.6  10  53.8  12 
Members with a Ph. D degree  25.7  9  8.5  7 
Members with background in finance or 




Members with background in accounting  14.2  5  14.5  8 
Members with background in law  11.4  6  9.9  8 
Female  members  13.5 4  15.3 7 
Foreigners  9.1 4  22.7 6 
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Table 4:4  
Board Committees: Characteristics 
 
This table presents the existence and the composition of committees that are either required or 
recommended by the Bank of Thailand. The information is as of 2003. The total number of banks 
operating in 2003 is 13. 
 








% of banks where the 
committee exists 
100.0 84.6  84.6  100.0 
Number of total members  3.25  2.58  3.50  8.13 
Number of independent 
directors 
3.08 1.17  1.42  0.00 
% of banks where the 
committee is chaired by 
independent director 
100.0 63.6  63.6  0.0 
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Figure 5:1 
Concentration of the Banking Sector 
 
















Total Assets Classified by Ownership 
 
This table shows total assets held by banks classified by ownership. A bank is classified as controlled by the government, a family, and foreign investors if 
these shareholders hold at least 25% of the shares outstanding. Otherwise, the banks are classified as “others.” Note that in 1996, the bank that falls into the 





   1996  2001  2002  2003 
















% of Total 
Assets 
Government  banks  2 25.1 5 42.9 4 43.9 3 33.3 
Family  banks  12 61.9 1 9.0 1 9.3 1 9.9 
Foreign owned banks  0 0.0 4  7.8 4  7.5 4 7.3 
Other  banks  1 13.0 3 40.3 4 39.3 5 49.6 
Total   15 100.0 13  100.0 13  100.0  13 100.0     57 
Table 5:2 Profitability 
   Bank ROA  (%) 
 








     2001  2002  2003  2001  2002 2003 2001 2002 2003  2001 2002 2003 
    Krungthai  Bank    -0.45  0.76  0.77  1.99  1.86 2.00 0.75 0.78 0.71  2.16 1.71 1.58 
    Thai  Military  Bank    0.19  -0.04   1.24  1.20  0.98  0.87   1.71  1.02  
Government 
Bangkok Metropolitan 
Bank  -2.28      0.42     0.66        
banks  Siam City Bank   -2.40  0.70  -3.70 0.67  0.89 1.96 0.01 1.12 1.04  2.09 1.65 2.87 
    Bank  Thai  0.42  0.18 -1.52 -0.28 1.55 0.82 2.76 1.09 0.62  2.12 1.84 2.30 
    Mean  -0.90  0.40 -1.48 0.81  1.38 1.59 1.03 0.97 0.79  2.02 1.56 2.25 
Family  bank  Bank  of  Ayudhya    -0.60  0.45  0.60  1.16  1.48 1.64 0.62 0.96 1.49  2.02 1.75 1.74 
  
Bank of Asia (ABN 
AMRO)  -2.40  -1.88 1.08  2.07  2.26 2.26 1.10 1.53 1.53  2.71 2.71 2.54 




Nakornthon  Bank    -1.05  0.71  1.17  2.84  4.84 5.27 1.59 4.20 1.69  4.00 4.19 4.10 
   UOB Radanasin Bank   -1.22  0.29  0.15  0.36  2.41 2.87 1.49 0.89 1.04  2.59 2.13 2.62 
    Mean  -1.00  -0.07 -0.08 1.58  2.32 2.68 1.08 1.68 1.26  2.57 2.52 2.54 
    Bangkok  Bank    0.52  0.50  0.84  1.90  1.80 1.80 0.98 1.21 1.62  1.82 1.99 1.60 
  KasikornBank    0.22  0.88  1.81  2.27  2.45 2.38 1.06 1.05 1.67  2.54 2.11 1.74 
Widely  held  Siam  Commercial  Bank 0.08  -1.85 1.71  2.27  2.64 2.62 1.14 1.57 1.50  1.92 2.21 1.97 
banks  Thai  Military  Bank        0.82     1.86    1.33     1.49 
   Thanachart  Bank      0.77  0.72    1.97  1.95  0.50  1.10   0.92  1.43 
    Mean  0.27  0.08  1.18  2.15  2.21 2.12 1.06 1.08 1.45  2.09 1.81 1.64 
All  banks  Mean  0.63  -0.68 0.19  2.73  1.38 2.31 0.90 1.06 1.26  2.32 2.06 2.15 Table 5:3 
BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) 
 
   Bank 1998  2001  2002  2003 
   Krungthai Bank   11.3  12.7  14.3  17.5 
   Thai Military Bank   10.2  12.7  15.5    
Government   Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  1.0        
banks  Siam City Bank   5.8  16.2  11.3  10.6 
   Bank Thai     21.5  20.9  14.2 
   Radanasin Bank   16.8        
   Mean  9.0  15.8  15.5  14.1 
Family   Bank of Ayudhya   10.2  11.0  10.8  13.9 
banks   Nakornthon Bank   2.5        
   Mean  7.4  11.0  10.8  13.9 
   Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO)    10.9  13.4  13.3 
Foreign  DBS Thai Danu Bank  9.2  12.4  12.6  11.0 
banks  Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank     10.9  11.3  13.2 
   UOB Radanasin Bank     12.8  14.2  12.8 
   Mean  6.5  11.8  12.9  12.6 
   Bangkok Bank   13.4  11.3  11.5  15.9 
 KasikornBank    10.7  15.7  12.6  9.5 
Other  Siam Commercial Bank   9.6  16.6  14.0  12.9 
banks  Thai Military Bank         11.6 
   Thanachart Bank       32.3  26.9 
   Mean  10.7  14.5  17.6  15.4 
All banks  Mean  9.2  13.7  15.1  14.1 
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Table 5:4 
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans (%) 
 
   Bank  1998 2001 2002 2003 
   Krungthai Bank   45.57  14.71  25.90  24.66 
   Thai Military Bank   31.13  12.28  14.25   
Government   Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  72.05       
banks  Siam City Bank   61.73  0.07  0.16  2.66 
   Bank Thai  65.58  3.19  6.15  6.34 
   Radanasin Bank   69.10       
   Mean  57.53  7.56  11.62  11.22 
Family  Bank of Ayudhya   36.11  16.58  19.82  15.07 
banks  Nakornthon  Bank  40.88     
    Mean  38.50 16.58 19.82 15.07 
   Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO)  38.23  18.29  22.21  19.14 
Foreign  DBS Thai Danu Bank  53.80  5.87  8.94  10.46 
banks  Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank     2.11  2.64  2.76 
   UOB Radanasin Bank     0.85  2.64  3.66 
    Mean  46.02  6.78 9.11 9.01 
   Bangkok Bank   45.57  14.71  25.90  24.66 
  KasikornBank    42.00 13.10 18.46 12.84 
Other  Siam Commercial Bank   34.20  18.50  24.20  17.51 
banks  Thai Military Bank         9.89 
   Thanachart Bank       4.40  5.83 
    Mean  40.59 15.44 18.24 14.15 
All banks  Mean  49.41  9.48  12.40  10.68 
 
 
 Table 5:5  
Structure of Bank Fund: Liabilities and Equity 
 
   Bank 
Deposits/ 
Total assets (%) 
 
Total borrowing/ 
Total assets (%) 
Interbank/ 
Total assets (%) 
Equity/ 
Total assets (%) 
        2001  2003  2001 2003  2001 2003 2001 2003 
   Krungthai Bank   88.73   88.62   0.00  0.00  3.50   3.08   6.50   6.61  
   Thai Military Bank   82.02      7.52     4.52      3.71     
Government   Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  91.28      8.12      1.56     5.20     
banks  Siam City Bank   88.02   84.98   1.62  0.00  2.34   3.45   6.25   7.25  
   Bank Thai  62.10   76.33   2.12  1.30  13.35   7.57   4.24   2.60  
   Mean  82.43   83.31   3.88   0.43   5.06   4.70   5.18  5.48 
Family bank  Bank of Ayudhya   84.73   81.15   8.66  5.53  1.41   3.24   3.42  5.50 
   Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO)  87.64   83.27   3.09  2.88  1.87   2.38   5.43   8.56  
  DBS Thai Danu Bank  77.93   80.67   11.28   7.98   7.24  5.51  4.22   2.85  
 Foreign 
banks 
Standard Chartered Nakornthon 
Bank   82.45   74.83   0.00  0.00  8.99   15.73   4.56   7.03  
   UOB Radanasin Bank   76.54   77.49   0.00  0.00  15.66   13.05   4.97   7.39  
   Mean  81.86   79.48   4.61   3.28   7.04   7.98   4.79  6.46 
   Bangkok Bank   86.20   82.39   6.27  5.69  1.91   2.32   3.45   7.52  
  KasikornBank   85.79   83.39   6.29  7.29  1.78   0.86   3.49   5.94  
Widely held  Siam Commercial Bank   83.81   82.06   3.58  3.27  1.58   1.41   8.57   10.26  
banks  Thai Military Bank      86.52     1.92     3.70     6.94  
   Thanachart Bank      71.53      8.82     2.20     15.03  
   Mean  85.26   81.18   5.38   5.40   1.76   2.10   5.17  9.14 
All banks  Mean  82.86  81.81  9.81   3.62   5.18  5.10  4.57   7.19  
 Figure 5: 2 
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Figure 5:3 
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Table 5:6 
Regression of Deposit Growth Rate  
 
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results. The independent variable is deposit growth 
rate. State-owned bank is a dummy variable which is taken the value of one if the largest 
shareholder is the government, and zero otherwise. The sample includes all banks that were 
operating during 1996-2003. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. 
 
  (1) 
BIS capital adequacy ratio  0.160 (0.76) 
  
Earning before tax/ total assets  0.135 (0.40) 
  
Log of total assets  0.302 (0.22) 
  
State-owned bank  7.268**(2.29) 
  
Constant 7.105  (0.40) 
  
  
Year dummies  Yes 
  
F-statistic 3.55 
Adj R-squared  0.2173 
Number of sample banks  102 
  
 
 Table 5:7 
Turnover Ratio of Bank Stocks 
 
This table shows turnover ratio (%) of stocks of banks and firms traded in the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 2001-2003. The data 
are obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
 
   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
           
Bank stocks: % of market 
capitalization   25.17 20.34 23.94 26.25    21.58 19.10 15.91 15.99 15.12 
Turnover ratio - banking sector  1.94  43.85  132.98 59.77    46.29 90.13 62.57  123.20 96.29 
Turnover ratio - all sectors  2.00  44.33 100.38 119.05    68.95 171.17 200.33 281.22 177.06 








Correlation of Stock Returns and Three Variables 
 
The sample includes all banks from 1990 until 2003 or until the year when the banks were closed 
down. 
 
   NPL ratio  BIS ratio  Pre-tax 
profit/total assets 
Bank of Ayudhya  -0.24   0.70   0.06  
Bangkok Bank  -0.06   0.67   0.21  
Bank of Asia  0.46   -0.13   -0.08  
Bankthai  -0.25   0.38   0.35  
DBS Thai Danu Bank  0.75   -0.62   0.04  
Kasikorn Bank  -0.27   0.77   0.26  
Krung Thai Bank  0.24   -0.18   -0.04  
Siam Commercial Bank  0.11   0.40   -0.32  
Siam City Bank  -0.33   0.25   0.13  
Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank  -0.42   0.58   0.24  
Thai Military Bank  0.17   -0.02   -0.04  
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  0.10   -0.03   0.17  
Bangkok Bank of Commerce  n.a.  n.a.  0.53  
First Bangkok City Bank  n.a.  n.a.  0.50  
Laemthong Bank  n.a.  n.a.  0.24  
Union Bank of Bangkok  n.a.  n.a.  0.31  
           
 
 